Siblings or distant relatives? A comparison of populist radical right parties in Europe by Hirth, Martin Larsen
  
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN 
 
 
 
Siblings or distant relatives? 
A comparison of populist radical 
right parties in Europe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MASTER THESIS 
MARTIN LARSEN HIRTH 
SPRING 2009 
 
  ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  iii 
Abstract 
This thesis has compared which political issues that mobilize voters for populist radical right 
(PRR) parties in Europe. The research question is “Can populist radical right-voting be 
explained by the same political issues in Western and Central and Eastern Europe?” 
 
Recent theoretical development, by Pippa Norris and most notably Cas Mudde, claims that a 
pan-European approach is the most suitable way to conduct research on PRR-parties. This 
thesis sets out to perform an empirical test of their argument. If the pan-European approach 
holds true, it creates a major dispute within the literature of PRR-parties, especially with 
regards to the rule of inclusion in future research. It will also see, up until now, two separate 
party groups, populist radical parties of Western Europe and the more radical nationalist 
parties of Central and Eastern Europe, as one party family.  
 
The theoretical fundament is based on previous literature for PRR-parties, identifying which 
political issues that traditionally have been thought of as salient. In addition I have drawn on 
literature on the Central and Eastern Europe to identify issues that are stressed as important 
for PRR-parties in the region. Through a survey of the literature, I have constructed testable 
hypotheses for all issues connected to the PRR-parties. The thesis is of a quantitative nature, 
with logistic regression analyses as my method of choice. The analyses were conducted 
making use of data from European Values Study.   
 
The results showed that age and gender are significant characteristics for PRR-voters in the 
whole of Europe. Further on, immigration was confirmed as a salient issue for PRR-parties in 
Western Europe, but failed to yield a significant result in Central and Eastern Europe. Lack of 
confidence in the European Union is a political issue that mobilize PRR-voters all over 
Europe. More surprising is it that extremist attitudes towards minorities mobilize voters in 
both regions. The theoretical fundament argued that this would only be significant in Central 
and Eastern Europe due to a more radical political mainstream.  
 
Based on a higher number of significant variables, stronger effects of the variables and an 
overall higher probability of the Western European model, the thesis concludes that PRR-
voting in Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe is not explained by the same 
political issues.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Ever since the breakthrough of populist radical right (PRR) parties,1 from the mid-1970s and 
onwards, these parties have been given a considerable amount of attention from political 
scientists. Their impact on a number of western European party systems makes them an 
obvious target for research. The fall of the Soviet Union and communism in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE)2 has presented political scientists with a new empirical focus for party 
politics. Twenty years later the question that arises is whether or not the region constitutes a 
party system with different political parties from Western Europe? Recent literature argue that 
the Western and the Central and Eastern European are converging in terms of both party 
systems and political parties, moving towards an increasing similarity or that existing 
differences are irrelevant for many specific research projects (Mudde 2007; Bohrer II  et al. 
2000; Lewis 2000).  
 
My thesis falls under this subject, more specifically the convergence of PRR-parties from 
Western Europe (WE) and Central and Eastern Europe. The latest development within the 
literature on PRR-parties deals with this question (Mudde 2007; Norris 2005), and it is as a 
continuation of this discussion I position my thesis. In his award-winning book3, “Populist 
Radical Right Parties in Europe”, Cas Mudde argues that these parties share the same 
ideology and that a pan-European analysis is preferable (Mudde 2007). The explicit aim of the 
book is to provide such a perspective, reaching conclusions, which until otherwise proved, are 
valid for PRR-parties in all geographical contexts. It is from this point of departure my thesis 
will interact with the existing literature, building on the work by Mudde and conducting an 
empirical analysis to test his argument. Despite the fact that Mudde’s book has established 
itself as leading within the literature, I find that his argumentation for choosing a pan-
European approach is not sufficiently developed and that some of the aspects dealt with in the 
book are problematic when put against a Central and Eastern European context, a fact also 
recognized in several reviews (Ellinas 2008; Hanley 2008; Hirth 2009).  
 
                                                 
1
 My preferred term, other labels will only be used when discussing relevant literature, when only party/parties is 
used, this refers to the populist radical right 
2
 CEE = Former communist countries in Europe 
3
 Winner of the XIIIth Stein Rokkan Prize for Comparative Social research in 2008, ISSC/ECPR, Outstanding 
Academic Title, Choice 
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Some aspects must be taken into closer consideration before it is possible to conclude with a 
pan-European approach like Mudde. First, the Eastern European nationalism is not only 
xenophobic and verbally aggressive, but  “it can be also ethnically intolerant, irredentist, anti-
Semite and fearful of external/foreign domination” (Anastasakis 2000:24). This 
comprehension is shared by among others Blokker (2005:377), Greenfeld (1995:22) and 
Hainsworth (2000b:10). The understanding that more extreme and ethnic forms of 
xenophobia and nationalism are more usual in Eastern Europe is supported by the fact that the 
general party system has moved towards the right, often incorporating parties that potentially 
would be affected by a cordon sanitaire in Western Europe, into mainstream politics 
(Hockenos 1993:303) Second, an important aspect is the usage of Western economic 
perspectives, as the transition to market economy in CEE has created a political landscape 
where the difference between left and right is much less distinct than in Western Europe. In 
fact, perceived right-wing parties often adopt left-wing positions on the economy 
(Anastasakis 2000:26; Mudde 2007:121). Third, the converging influence provided by trans-
European party groups, often through co-operation in the European parliament, is by far less 
extensive for PRR-parties than it is for other party families (Pridham 2001:195). 
 
Considering these examples, it seems clear that empirical research is needed to obtain valid 
inferences on the possibility of moving towards a pan-European approach when researching 
PRR-parties. On the basis of my questioning of Mudde’s pan-European approach I set forth 
the following research question for the thesis: 
  
Can populist radical right-voting be explained by the same political issues in Western and 
Central and Eastern Europe? 
 
The study sets out to identify and compare which political issues that mobilize PRR-voters 
across Europe. If PRR-parties can be compared, as Mudde claims, parties should mobilize on 
the same issues among voters in both Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. 
Identifying the political issues connected to these parties also has implications for 
classification and subsequent research, as will be elaborated on in the theoretical chapter.  
 
The thesis will not explain variation in the vote share of the PRR-parties, but identify if the 
actual vote is motivated by the same political issues across Europe. The focus will therefore 
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be on political issues, not characteristics of the individual voter or the party itself, although 
these will be controlled for.  
 
1.1 Justifying the thesis 
Theoretical discussions of good research questions seem to incorporate two general criteria. 
The question must be of importance and it must contribute to the cumulative knowledge 
within the literature (George and Bennett 2004; King et al. 1994; Skocpol 2003). 
 
By being of importance, the research question needs to be consequential for a large number of 
people on a political, social or economic level, or be able to predict future events (King et al. 
1994). It is clear that on a political level PRR-parties have had a large effect, both in regards 
to the increasing emphasis of the socio-cultural dimension in party politics, but also their 
effect on mainstream politics through “a contagion of the right” (Bale 2003:157; Hossay and 
Zolberg 2002:305; Rydgren 2005b:420-421; Widfeldt 2004). 
 
In addition to the obvious political impact, it can also be argued that the presence of PRR-
parties have implications of both an economic and social nature. As shown by Mudde (2007), 
parties have strong opinions on the usage of national spending on “non-native” members of 
society. The SIREN 4  project points to the fact that PRR-parties have not succeeded in 
countries without an extensive welfare state (Mileti and Plomb 2007).  
 
As for social aspects, the increased focus on the socio-cultural dimension credited to the PRR-
parties (Rydgren 2005b) has introduced a stronger emphasis on cultural differences and 
possible cultural conflicts between “insiders” and “outsiders” of the nation. Xenophobia is 
constantly identified as a key concept in the populist radical right ideology (Betz and Johnson 
2004:316; Mudde 2000a:58; Rensmann 2003:112). This creates a different social atmosphere 
that is susceptible to cultural conflicts as seen in the Netherlands, with the murders of 
politician Pim Fortuyn and film director Theo van Gogh. Wouter van der Brug and colleagues 
(2005:559) put forward the argument that, what they call anti-immigrant parties, have a 
significantly larger potential based on the increased salience of the immigration issue than 
they have achieved in elections.  
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 EU financed research project on the changing worklife and appeal of the radical right 
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Through taking active part in a scholarly discussion regarding the comparability of PRR-
parties, it is also clear that the thesis can provide added information to the cumulative 
knowledge of PRR-parties. As I will come back to in the next chapter, the expansion made by 
Mudde has implications for how we look at PRR-parties in Western Europe as well. A 
number of researchers identify immigration as the uniting issue of the parties, and even as the 
parties’ main area of competence (Betz 2002:206; Fennema 2005:1; Ivarsflaten 2008). 
However, with immigration not being politicized in Central and Eastern Europe (Minkenberg 
and Perrineau 2007), the approach taken by Mudde would lump them together with parties 
that focus on other forms of out-groups. As such, my results can also provide information on 
how to select and identify PRR-parties. If Mudde’s approach is confirmed, it presents a clear 
shift in the comparative study of PRR-parties, as it brings together parties from two regions 
that, up until now, have been analyzed almost exclusively separately. If the pan-European line 
of thought does not hold true, it can bring together parties that should not be compared. It is 
therefore in the interest of the academic study of PRR-parties to conduct empirical research 
on this question. By examining Mudde’s argument, the thesis is clearly theory-testing, 
searching for valid causal inferences on which political issues that mobilize voters for PRR-
parties. His book is also of a recent date, and too my knowledge this thesis is one of the first 
major replies to his approach.  
 
1.2  Where we are today – a geographical overview 
The large majority of the literature on PRR-parties, including classics such as Kitschelt & 
McGann’s “The Radical Right in Western Europe: A comparative analysis”(1995) and Hans-
Georg Betz’s “Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe” (1994), have focused solely 
on countries west of the Iron Curtain. Despite the different perspectives chosen to explain the 
emergence, sustainability or failure of the PRR-parties, the relative homogeneity of Western 
Europe have downplayed the question of whether or not a cross-country approach was 
appropriate.  
 
However, with the fall of the Soviet Union and transformation to mass democracy in Central 
and Eastern Europe, a new arena of party politics was established (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Lewis 
2000; Millard 2004). The political vacuum that appeared after the downfall of communism 
proved to susceptible to nationalist and extremist sentiments, as far right parties achieved 
success in early elections across the region (Hockenos 1993:5). The thorough transformation 
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of society presented far-right parties with opportunities not present in Western Europe 
(Minkenberg 2002:355). 
 
Despite the large number of new parties that emerged, little attention has been given to the 
study of PRR parties in CEE countries (Anastasakis 2000:6; Mudde 2007:3-4). What has been 
written are mostly single case studies included in edited volumes, where they constitute a 
small minority of the study. The few major research projects concerning the CEE (Mudde 
2005c; Ramet 1999) have dealt with the radical and extreme right in an exclusively CEE 
context, giving a descriptive narrative of the present situation in a number of post-communist 
countries.  
 
Perhaps the first major book to attempt to comparatively explain the PRR-parties in a larger 
geographical context is “Radical Right” by Pippa Norris (2005). She analyses voters’ 
behaviour in the electoral market. Norris takes a wide geographical approach, including 
thirty-nine different nations in her analysis. She argues that the traditional area-specific 
approach potentially leads scholars to overlook growing convergence across old dichotomies, 
such as between Western and post-Communist Europe. While acknowledging the potential 
problems with expanding generalizations across regions, Norris put forward the argument that 
her comparative framework allows the researcher to examine voting patterns under a great 
variety of conditions, potentially expanding the scope of empirical generalizations (Norris 
2005:36-7) 
 
Despite generating valuable insights regarding PRR parties, she is unable to discover 
generalizations that hold true for all of her empirical data. However, this does not necessarily 
mean that cross-region comparisons are unsuitable when researching PRR parties. When 
selecting cases for inclusion Norris relies primarily on a left-right scale (Norris 2005:57). By 
using this method, Norris does not consider that the left-right spectre not necessarily accounts 
for the same issues or understanding across countries and certainly not across such diverse 
regions as those included in the study. This severely weakens the measurement validity of 
Norris’ measure. Subsequently this opens up for the inclusion of irrelevant parties or 
exclusion of relevant parties that potentially can damage the attempt to achieve causal 
inferences for a previously unprecedented geographical area.  
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Following in the geographical footsteps of Norris, albeit with smaller steps, Cas Mudde 
conducts a pan-European analysis of the populist radical right, adding Central and Eastern 
European parties to the analysis (Mudde 2007). With the vast majority of research being 
focused on Western Europe, Mudde agrees with the statement given by Onthon Anastasakis 
that “there is a lack of a comparative pan-European perspective (Anastasakis in Mudde, 
2007:3). As mentioned his aim is to provide such a perspective, which sets up the point of 
departure for my thesis. By comparing which issues that mobilize PRR-voters both in 
Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe; it can be identified if the parties are as 
similar as claimed by Mudde. Through contrasting regional analyses with a pan-European 
analysis I can also show how the latter creates a biased perception of which issues that 
mobilize voters. 
 
1.3  Structure of the thesis  
Chapter two will present the theoretical framework which forms the basis of the thesis. The 
chapter starts by highlighting a debate within the literature on the troublesome task of 
defining PRR-parties, showing some of the implications connected to definitional power. 
Second, I present the theoretical basis for the various issues that have been presented in the 
present literature on the populist radical right as important for their existence. From these 
issues I construct hypotheses for later testing. The chapter ends by constructing a debate on 
whether or not Europe is to be treated as two distinct regions, east and west, or if the 
similarities are prominent enough to ignore this division in the case of PRR-parties. I 
exemplify it through discussing nationalism and the converging effect of transnational party 
groups.  
 
In the third chapter I turn to the methodological framework most suitable for my research 
question. I start off by introducing my method of choice, logistic regression before giving a 
detailed presentation of the variables. I end the chapter by discussing the data used in the 
analyses. In chapter four I carry out and present the analyses. I gradually build a model 
suitable to explain which issues that mobilize PRR-voting in Europe. Three separate analyses 
are conducted, first a pan-European, before conducting regional analyses for WE and CEE to 
identify difference. The fifth and final chapter contains the discussion of the hypotheses in the 
light of the regression results. I end the chapter by concluding the general research question, 
discuss the implications of my findings, and provide advice for future research.  
 
  7 
2 Theoretical framework 
 
In this chapter I am going to map out the theoretical arguments behind the issues that possibly 
unite populist right-wing parties across Europe. The chapter is divided into three separate 
sections. The first section covers the definitional debate within the literature, showing how 
different definitions can have big implications for the inclusion of cases and subsequently the 
results provided. The second section chapter presents the theoretical background for the 
political issues normally considered to be central for the populist radical right. On the basis of 
these issues I will construct the hypotheses. The third and final part of the theory chapter 
shows how nationalism and a lack of transnational party groups can provide arguments 
against a convergence of European PRR-parties.  
 
2.1 A war of words: Definitional disputes 
Unlike most other party families, the PRR- party is not recognizable by party name and even 
the debate on what to name the party family is far from settled (Hainsworth 2000b:8; Norris 
2005:43). A number of different names have been used in the literature; among those are 
radical right, radical right-wing populism, new populism, extreme right-wing, fascism, 
nativism, anti-immigrant and several other options (Mudde 2007:12)5.  
 
The picture gets even more complicated when one takes into consideration that there is also a 
great disunity on the defining characteristics of the parties. In his study of the ideology of the 
PRR-parties Cas Mudde identified 58 different characteristics taken from 26 separate 
definitions (Mudde 2000a:11). Paul Hainsworth (2000b:8) summarizes that “there are 
problems in conceptualizing and defining the extreme right”. Some scholars also argue that 
these parties must be understood on the basis of their own national contexts and that a cross-
country generalization is undesirable (Anastasakis 2000; Schain et al. 2002). 
 
A list compiled by Sarah de Lange reveals that the most used definitions consists of a 
combination of some or all of the following words: extreme, anti-immigrant, populist, radical, 
right with characteristics closely connected to the abovementioned terms (de Lange 2008:60).  
Mudde explains this multitude of variations as a result of the neglect by researchers to commit 
time and space to a discussion, often relying on previous work or choosing a term without a 
                                                 
5
 For a complete overview, see Mudde (2007:12) 
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reflective discussion of its usefulness (Mudde 2007:12). Discussing several approaches on 
how to best define a party, Mudde lands on an ideological approach where he seeks out the 
core concepts of the “usual suspects”, leading to somewhat surprising results, like the 
inclusion of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and the exclusion of the Norwegian 
Progress Party and the Swiss People’s Party.  
 
2.1.1 Implications of different definitions 
Through constructing a conceptual framework Mudde identifies the concept of nativism (my 
italics) as a minimum definition that is able to “travel” across Europe. Nativism is defined as 
“ an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the 
native group (“the nation”) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are 
fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state” (Mudde 2007:19). Nativism is 
seen to be a more precise term than nationalism, which Mudde argues has been severely 
weakened by conceptual stretching and losing its accuracy (Mudde 2007:16-20; Sartori 1970) 
 
With this as his point of departure, Mudde continues by adding two more elements to form his 
maximum definition. In his definition of authoritarianism, Mudde is in line with the dominant 
tradition in social psychology, using Theodor Adorno et.al interpretation of the term as being 
subservient and act uncritically toward authoritative figures (Adorno et.al in Mudde 2007:23). 
In the context of Mudde’s definition it is possible to both be authoritarian and also be 
democratic. The final core element is populism, which plays on the idea of a divided society, 
the people and the elites. Several writers on populism emphasize the importance of bringing 
politics back into the hands of the people, or the importance of the general will of the people 
(Canovan 2002; Mény and Surel 2002; Taggart 2000). It is not a term exclusively used for 
rightist parties, but has been closely connected to the PRR-parties (Zaslove 2008). The term 
best suited to describe the core concepts of the definition, according to Mudde, is populist 
radical right. He distances himself from the term “extreme right” used by among other Ignazi, 
Hainsworth and Carter, as the word “extreme” implies an anti-democratic attitude, a view 
shared by Kitschelt (2007). 
 
While the PRR-parties are sceptical towards how democracy works today, they are not of a 
revolutionary kind, but instead working for an alternative form of government (Betz 1998:3; 
Mudde 2000a:12; Norris 2005:44). Also, the anti-system component in Ignazi’s definition 
(Ignazi 2007) of the extreme right is dependent on the system in question, making the 
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definition less stable than desired. Instead, Mudde uses the term radical, defined as opposition 
to some key features of liberal democracy, combining it with “the right” to illustrate the 
direction of radicalization. Recognizing the various areas “right” can point to, Mudde draws 
on Noberto Bobbios distinction between the left and the right based on their approach to 
egalitarianism. The right is therefore defined as “the belief in a natural order with 
inequalities” (Mudde 2007:26). As is visible from this, the definitions of radical and right 
function as indicators of nativism. Adding the concept of populism into the party label Mudde 
chooses to put it as a prefix, ending up with populist radical right as the final party label. 
Choosing this alternative, it better highlights the centrality of nativism as the core concept, 
while the other alternative, radical right populism, as used by Hans-Georg Betz, Jens Rydgren 
and others (de Lange 2008:60), would have given more attention to populism, which is below 
nativism in the hierarchy of core concepts (Mudde 2007:26).  
 
Mudde’s arguments, of course, have counter-arguments. Since his book is of recent date, the 
number of direct reactions is limited. However, based on arguments presented in earlier 
research by authors using different terms it is possible to spot several disagreements. The 
biggest difference is spotted between Mudde and Wouter van der Brug and colleagues6. The 
latter identifies the parties through their stance on immigration, arguing that the only 
programmatic link all parties share is their resentment towards immigration, thus the most 
suitable label would be anti-immigrant parties (Fennema 2005:1). This line of thought puts 
more emphasis on the unity of immigration politics than a broader ideology. In addition to the 
work by van der Brug et.al, others have also either used the term or pointed to the fact that 
immigration is the only uniting element of the parties (Gibson 2002; Ivarsflaten 2008). This 
way of labelling the populist radical right is probably the one that goes most head to head with 
the pan-European approach taken by Mudde.  
 
According to the anti-immigration definition, parties that do not have a clear stand against 
immigration and is attractive to voters on this ground should not be counted as a member of 
the party family. The emphasis on opposition to immigration as the key concept is somewhat 
different than the concept of nativism, as the latter term allows outsiders to come from within 
the nation as well, as opposed to the traditional understanding of an immigrant as someone 
with a different citizenship moving to a new country (Mudde 2007:65). Both approaches rely 
                                                 
6
 See (Fennema 1997, 2005; Van der Brug and Fennema 2003, 2007; Van der Brug et al. 2005) 
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on an “us versus them”, but the distinction is the construction of “them”. It is clear that 
defining parties as anti-immigrant is more narrow than by the term nativism, as it incorporates 
only one out of four different constructions of “them” presented by Mudde (Mudde 2007:65).  
 
This has further implications for the comparability of parties across Europe. If we decide to 
follow Mudde, nativism seems well able to travel from West to East. Remembering the 
definition of the term, it encompasses every non-native element that is seen as a threat to the 
homogenous nation-state. This includes both immigrants and, most typically in Eastern 
Europe, long-term ethnic minorities formally citizens of the state in question, but not the 
nation (Mudde 2007:68-71). A typical example is the large number of Hungarians living in 
Slovakia or the Roma population. A wider definition would naturally lead to the inclusion of 
more parties in research projects.  
 
Researchers using the anti-immigrant term has been focusing exclusively on Western Europe, 
but it is possible to see how their definition would relate to Central and Eastern Europe. 
Several researchers acknowledge that immigration is not a heavily politicized issue in Central 
and Eastern Europe, giving a low priority to this in party propaganda (Merkl 2003:17; 
Minkenberg 2002:446; Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007:51; Mudde 2005b; 2007:71). This is 
not surprising as the case in Central and Eastern Europe to a large degree is that of emigration 
rather than immigration, especially with the recent enlargement of the European Union 
(Eurostat 2007). With the lack of focus on immigration policies, the anti-immigrant definition 
would likely exclude, if not all, at least a number of the Central and Eastern European parties 
identified by Mudde. This is recognized by van der Brug and Fennema (2006:2) who propose 
to name the party group radical right  if Central and Eastern Europe is included. But they are 
unclear as to which implications this has for the rule of inclusion of PRR-parties. Ivarsflaten 
concludes on the selection of cases that “future studies would be well advised to identify all 
parties that sought to mobilize grievances over immigration” (Ivarsflaten 2008:17). If the 
parties in Western Europe are identified through their unity on immigration issues, we see a 
clear division between Mudde pan-European approach and the “anti-immigrant camp”. 
Extending the reasoning, the “anti-immigrant camp” would most likely not agree with Mudde 
that parties such as LDPR, SNS and MIEP7 can be equated with the more familiar French 
National Front, Danish People’s Party and Vlaams Belang.  
                                                 
7
 Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Slovak National Party and Hungarian Justice and Life Party 
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In this thesis I will follow the term used by Mudde, populist radical right-parties (Mudde 
2007:26). The reason for this is twofold. First, as I position my thesis very close to Mudde I 
see it as natural to use the label to avoid confusion. Second, I find his arguments for this 
particular term to be sound. I have already argued for why I do not find the term extreme to be 
accurate. As already displayed the largest difference is between those who use the term anti-
immigration and those using a combination of radical, populism, right in different orders. In 
my opinion the anti-immigrant term is too narrow as a definition. While immigration may be 
the only political issue that unites PRR-parties across countries, it is not excluded that other 
issues may be significant in specific countries (Ivarsflaten 2008). In that way I find populist 
radical right to be more inclusive than anti-immigrant. Regarding the order of radical and 
populist, I agree with Mudde that “nativism, not populism, is the ultimate core feature of the 
party family, radical right should be the primary term in the concept” (Mudde 2007:26).  
 
2.1.2 Supply vs. demand-side focus 
A second debate connected to the disagreement concerning definitions and terminology is the 
nature of the independent variables. Using a rational choice perspective, voters are often 
described as working in a political market, positioning themselves according to his/her own 
demands and the supply of parties (Van der Brug and Fennema 2007:476). Koopmans et.al 
(2005) refer to theories that “focus on the political opportunity structure as supply-side 
theories and to theories that focus on grievance as demand-side theories” (Koopmans 
2005:146). While demand-side theories have been a mainstay in research on PRR-parties, it 
has become increasingly obvious that they alone cannot explain the variation in success 
(Koopmans et al. 2005; Mudde 2007; Norris 2005; Van der Brug et al. 2005). Mudde calls 
demand-side theories the “perfect breeding ground” (2007:201), but when the breeding 
ground is more or less constant, as the socio-structural background is in most of Western 
Europe, demand-side theories are unable to explain why the Danish People’s Party thrive in 
Denmark, when New Democracy was a mere flash-party in Sweden. This view is further 
strengthened when considering the evidence presented by van der Brug et.al (2005) on the 
untapped electoral potential of the populist radical right. When parties exploit their potential 
at such different levels it is common sense to include parties themselves into the analysis.  
 
The call for supply-side theories to explain variation in success is justified and echoed by 
Mudde, who makes a strong case for turning the attention more fully to supply-side theories 
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(Mudde 2007:297-303). This thesis agrees that demand-side theories alone cannot explain 
variation in electoral success. However, the goal of this thesis is not to explain variation in 
success, but rather perform an empirical test of which political issues that  mobilize voters for 
PRR-parties. This brings me back to the sociological theories, i.e. demand-side theories.  
 
Supply-side theories put a stronger emphasis on parties and the opportunities presented by the 
political structure (Kitschelt and McGann 1995:14). Here, the relevance and connection 
between the nature and disagreement of variables to include, becomes clear. A definition is a 
tool to choose the correct parties. With his deep-going classification and conceptualization of 
parties, Mudde implicitly argues that we identified the parties that should be included in 
analyses and that attention now can be shifted to supply-side factors. However, the clear 
contrast of definitions previously elaborated illustrates the need to slow down the move from 
demand to supply.  
 
Taking a step back and considering how the different definitions handle an expansion to 
Central and Eastern Europe, it is a possibility that a supply-side study would not include the 
same parties. The lack of agreement in Western Europe has implications for the expansion to 
other regions. An empirical test is able to shed some light on the many questions made visible 
by the disagreement in the literature on what characterises the populist radical right.  
 
2.2 Political issues and hypotheses 
Existing theories of party system evolution, both those inspired by the Downsean economic 
tradition, (Downs 1957) and by the political sociological tradition of Lipset and Rokkan 
(1967), agree on one point (Ivarsflaten 2008:2). Unless there is some sort of major societal 
change that gives rise to a new public grievance, it is unlikely that a new party will emerge. 
Looking at party formation through the eyes of Downs, new parties are most successfully 
launched immediately after a significant change in the ideological distribution among voters. 
Originators of new office-seeking parties feel that they can represent a number of voters who 
are not getting the representation necessary to have their views voiced properly in the 
legislative arena (Downs 1957:115/127). Lipset and Rokkan emphasize the close connection 
between cleavages, the expansion of suffrage and the rise of new parties. It is the cleavages in 
society that polarize societies enough to bring forth political parties to represent the various 
sides of the conflict (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). This implicitly argues that a major change in 
society is necessary to create a new cleavage. The following sub-chapters will present 
  13 
political issues, that have had an increasing importance, and that are thought to have an effect 
on the populist radical right, each sub-chapter ending with a concrete hypothesis.  
 
2.2.1 Who are the others?  
At the heart of the populist radical right lies a form of identity politics based on the creation of 
an “us versus them” dichotomy. To construct “us” – the in-group – it is also necessary to 
construct “them” – the out-group. Often it is easier to distinguish who constitute the out-group 
than vice versa (Mudde 2007:63). In Western Europe there is a near consensus that 
immigration has an effect on the populist radical right (Betz 1994; Flecker 2007; Rydgren 
2002; Van der Brug et al. 2005). Betz argues that for PRR-parties immigration has been the 
main area of political competence (Betz 2002:206). This implies that they have gained issue 
ownership over the increasingly salient issue of immigration (Budge and Farlie 1983; 
Hainsworth 2008:76).  Hainsworth (2008:76) and Norris (2005:175) makes a point of the fact 
that it is not necessarily the shear number of immigrants, as much as the fear of immigrants, 
that attracts voters to the populist radical right. While the immigration issue is important most 
scholars argue against the perception of the party group as single issue parties (Carter 2005; 
Ivarsflaten 2006a; Mudde 1999, 2000b). It is clear that the most recognized out-group for 
parties in Western Europe are immigrant minorities.  
 
The challenges to a pan-European study appear with the identification of the out-group in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Mudde pinpoints the differences when he correctly identifies 
indigenous minorities as the main enemy; parties give a rather low degree of attention to 
immigrants  (Mudde 2007:69; 2005b). As highlighted in the discussion on party labels earlier 
in the chapter, the expansion of an anti-immigrant label to Central and Eastern Europe would 
thus not include many new parties. In this section I will argue that the resistance towards 
immigrants in Western Europe is characterized first and foremost by a cultural form of racism, 
while the resistance towards indigenous minorities in Central and Eastern Europe has a more 
distinct ethnical/biological form of racism. I base my argument on two indicators. First, the 
presence of Jews and the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe gives the debate a more direct 
touch of ethnicity. Second, the political scene in Central and Eastern Europe is much more 
radical than in Western Europe, allowing for a stronger and different rhetoric that would 
marginalize parties if used in Western Europe. If these differences are reflected through 
empirical research it questions the comparability of parties. 
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Betz argues that the populist radical right stands for a “cultural nativism, which increasingly 
concerns itself with the future of European identity and particularly of the Western value 
system (Betz 2003:84). References to a cultural community and the importance of preserving 
this is also found by de Lange in her study on PRR-parties in power in Western Europe (de 
Lange 2008:64). The cultural form of racism is also evident in the observation by Rydgren, 
while parties want to limit immigration to a minimum, assimilation of already existing 
immigrants are reluctantly accepted (Rydgren 2005a). Fennema even goes as far as claiming 
that racist arguments are those that “explain social inequality by reference to biological 
differences that are hereditary” (Fennema 2005:8). Such a definition would actually not label 
cultural differentionalism as cultural racism and is in my view to go to far, yet it underlines 
the difference between cultural and biological racism. The attention to cultural aspects is 
illustrated through the behavior of the Flemish Vlaams Belang, the French FN and the 
German Republikaner described briefly below.  
 
Party leader of the Vlaams Belang, Filip Dewinter, precisely presents the main consequence 
of immigration in Western Europe. He claims that the end of the cold war marked the shift 
from the old left-right dimension to a socio-cultural dimension which pits identity up against 
multiculturalism (Betz and Johnson 2004:316). The importance of the socio-cultural 
dimension is an aspect emphasized by a large majority of researchers (Betz 1998; Rydgren 
2005b; Norris 2005). As argued by Betz and Johnson, this reflects the growing attention given 
to questions concerning culture, values and identity. Dewinter uses these variables to position 
himself against accusations of racism, saying that “racism means a belief that on the basis of 
racial features a group of people is superior or inferior to another. This isn’t what we believe; 
everyone is equal but not the same” (Betz and Johnson 2004:316). A similar approach is 
officially used by the Front National, despite some implicit biological racism from time to 
time. The defense of French national values and identity is at the forefront of issues (Mayer 
1998:16). Hainsworth notes that the FN has shied away from systematically using biological 
racism in their arguments. While Le Pen and the leadership often resort to an implicit version 
of biological racism, it is interesting to observe the effect that has in the polls. Purely 
biological racial outbursts tend to lead to a drop in support of the FN (Hainsworth 2000a:25).  
 
Following the correlation between biological racism and poor performance in polls, Terri 
Givens observes that those parties who avoid straightforward biological racism, and instead 
emphasize a more cultural form of differences, have performed better at the polls (Givens 
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2005:201-215). My understanding is that it is a result of the acceptance level on the Western 
European political stage. It is plausible to assume that explicit biological racism will have a 
similar effect to the Willie Horton-campaign from the 1988 American presidential campaign 
between Dukakis and Bush. After former civil rights campaigner Jesse Jackson publicly 
accused the Horton-campaign of being racist, Dukakis gained ground on Bush, albeit too late 
to catch up (Mendelberg 2001). This is further strengthened through the theory of reputational 
shields for PRR-parties. Ivarsflaten argue that unless a party has a reputational shield, a 
legacy that can fend off accusations of racism and extremism, it is impossible to portray 
themselves as credible (Ivarsflaten 2006). Drawing on the Norwegian experience, the 
immigration debate is well describe through the book by Anniken Hagelund: “The Importance 
of being decent” (2003). The political norm on racism in Western Europe put restraints on the 
acceptable political rhetoric.  
 
In addition to the cultural resistance against immigrants, I find it valuable to take a closer look 
at the relationship between immigrants and unemployment. A well-known slogan by Jean 
Marie Le Pen highlights the number of immigrants to the number of job-less natives, “Two 
million immigrants are the cause of two million French people out of work” (Golder 
2003:438). The interaction effect of immigration and unemployment is significant at 
aggregate level in Golder’s analysis and it would be interesting to see if similar effects can be 
identified at individual level. Terri Givens argue that while there may not be an actual 
relationship between unemployment and level of immigration, voters may perceive such a 
relationship (Givens 2005:75)  If the variable is significant it indicates that PRR-voters fear 
the economic consequences of immigration just as much as the cultural aspects. Unemployed 
voters may find it plausible to blame immigrants for their current problems regardless of how 
true this is. 
  
If the attention is moved eastwards, the situation seems to be somewhat different. The 
problem of “the other” is either people with an unclear national identity,8 like the Roma and 
the Jews, or people with a different national identity, like the big Hungarian minorities in 
neighboring Romania and Slovakia. Berglund et.al agree that it is impossible to deny the 
impact made on the Central and Eastern societies by national sentiments and ethnic identity. 
With enclaves and exclaves of national minorities, the focus on these issues is further 
                                                 
8
 Acoording to the populist radical right perception of national identity 
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strengthened, drawing the line back to unsuccessful state and nation-building processes, for 
which the reasons are too many to be included in this thesis (Berglund et al. 2001:79-89).  
 
In his introduction to “Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Society”, Peter Merkl 
writes that it is not easy to separate racism from nationalism, and states that the difference 
between the two regions of Europe is perhaps the greatest contrast among contemporary 
movements of the European radical right (Merkl 2003:7-15). Using the Russian case as an 
example, the greatest achievement of the PRR-parties is a radicalization of the political 
discourse (Tolz 2003:251). This increases the level of tolerance for racist political discourse, 
opening up for situations like the hostile treatment of the Roma in Bulgaria where anti-racism 
is not on the political agenda (Ivanov 2005:2-21).  
 
The harassment of the Roma and Jews are far more widespread in Central and Eastern Europe, 
partly as a natural consequence of the larger number, especially of Roma, but also because it 
is much less condemned than it would have been in Western Europe. Nearly all countries 
report about persecution of the Roma (Mudde 2005c; Westin 2003:97). A popular prejudice is 
that they are primitive and can only be dealt with “by a whip and a small yard (Mudde 
2007:87).  
 
The Jews is another group singled out by PRR-parties in Central and Eastern Europe, being 
named as one of three9 special enemies by Mudde (2007:78). Anti-Semitism has long been 
connected with far-right movements and especially after the Second World War. The 
aftermath of the Holocaust practically banned anti-Semitism from public debate in Western 
Europe (Mudde 2007:80), but is has been present to a larger degree in the former communist 
countries. Therefore Central and Eastern European parties are much more open on their anti-
Semitism than in Western Europe. This has, in my opinion to do with what a credible party in 
Western Europe can allow itself to say in public and also that anti-Semitism is not a very 
central feature in the ideology of PRR-parties in Western Europe (Mudde 2007:80-81). A 
rather shocking example of the rhetoric involving Jews comes from Romania where a 
publication connected to the perceived mainstream party PDSR wrote that “as is well known, 
the Jewish unleavened bread requires kosher fresh Christian blood (Shafir 1999:228). PDSR 
later became involved with the leading Romanian populist radical right party, PRM and 
                                                 
9
 The two others being Muslims and the Roma 
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exemplifies both how the discourse has been radicalized and that the cordon sanitaire 
exercised in many countries in WE is not present at the same rate in CEE.  
 
Sexual deviants, most often in form of homosexuals, are also targeted as enemies by PRR-
parties (Mudde 2007). While a number of parties do not take an aggressive stance against 
homosexuality, Pim Fortuyn himself was gay; it is more of an issue in Catholic and Orthodox 
countries. It is seen as a biological and social abnormality and also “as a threat to the survival 
of the nation” (Mudde 2007:68). While not explicitly connected to biological racism, the 
concept of homophobia has a common denominator in extremism and low tolerance for 
people who deviate from the majority of the population.      
 
When summing up his edited volume on racist extremism in Central and Eastern Europe 
Mudde observes that a racist discourse can be found in almost all mainstream parties and to 
some degree have been incorporated into other political issues, such as irredentism in 
Romania and Slovakia. Mainstream parties are also less willing to come forward and 
condemn racist extremism than in the West (Mudde 2005a:277-281).  
 
Judging by the presentations above it seems to me that parties base their opposition to their 
respective out-groups on different foundations. The political climate in Western Europe and 
the emphasis on culture results in a cultural racism. However, in Central and Eastern Europe 
the political discourse is much more radicalized and the dividing line between PRR-parties 
and mainstream politics is less clear (Millard 2004:224-251). Whereas a voter from East 
probably would embrace cultural racism as it is a step down on the ladder of extremism, it is 
far from certain that it also works the other way around. The step from guarding one’s own 
traditional values to openly supporting biological racism is steep. If this assumption is correct 
the comparability between PRR-parties across regions is on dubious grounds.  
 
On the basis of this I set forth three hypotheses:  
 
H1a: PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilize voters who want stricter immigration 
regulations based on a cultural aspect 
H1b: PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilize voters who want stricter immigration 
regulations based on job insecurity 
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H1c: PRR-parties in Eastern and Central Europe mobilize voters who express extreme 
attitudes  
 
2.2.2 Political disillusionment  
Europe has experienced a number of political changes in the last decades. This section will 
present three changes that theoretically can explain why PRR-parties attract voters. I will 
show how the populist elements of the parties distance them from the mainstream and make 
them attractive for protest votes. Second, the European Union provides a natural enemy for 
the populist radical right. Finally, an alternative explanation holds the parties as a reaction to 
increasing postmaterialism (Inglehart 1977) in the Western world. While it seems unlikely 
that postmaterialism has an explanatory effect in Central and Eastern Europe, due to 
Ingleharts limited geographical approach, it has the potential to highlight differences between 
the two parts of Europe.   
 
2.2.3    The protest vote 
Robert Putnam and Susan Pharr have identified that political trust and satisfaction with 
government is on the decline in Western Europe. Recent Eurobarometer data shows that this 
is also true for Central and Eastern Europe (Pharr and Putnam 2000; Eurobarometer 2007). 
An argument can be made that PRR-parties attract voters as a result of being a new alternative 
to mainstream politics, by attracting protest votes. Van der Brug et.al point to the fact that 
these voters are still rational as they intend to send a message to the political elites and does 
so through a deliberate action (Van der Brug et al. 2000). In a later review of the protest vote-
literature, Van der Brug and Fennema (2006) split the traditional conception of the protest 
vote into two separate notions of protest voting and policy voting. A vote is a protest vote if it 
is cast out of discontent and lack of trust in institutions, whereas the policy vote is based on 
agreement with the policy considerations of the party. However, this is not a division that is 
used in the entire literature (Van der Brug and Fennema 2006:5-6).  The variables connected 
to the protest vote-concept in my thesis ask about lack of confidence in institutions. That 
implies that it falls under the more narrow protest vote-concept of Van der Brug and Fennema. 
Significant results on more policy-oriented variables would imply that a vote casted for PRR-
parties is policy vote.  
 
The protest vote must be seen in the light of the populist elements of the parties. Whether it is 
seen as a ideological aspect (Mudde 2007) or as a political rhetoric (Betz 2002), it is a central 
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element for the populist radical right. Nearly all scholars on the topic have some form of a 
reference to populism. The definition by Mudde holds populism as a division between “the 
pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, also highlighting the will of the people (2007:23). 
While Mudde sees populism as an ideology, his definition is in line with other scholars who 
see it as a political rhetoric. Both Mený and Súrel (2002) and Canovan (2002) emphasize that 
politics have escaped control of the people.  
 
Almost all PRR-parties speak up for a closer relationship between the public and politics, 
portraying themselves as the voice of the people (Mileti and Plomb 2007:11). In fact, some of 
them even dislike the word party to describe themselves, preferring the term movement. They 
benefit from their relative clean record sheet in mainstream politics and present themselves as 
“distinct alternatives outside the political class”, clean-hands alternatives, which want to give 
the power back to the people” (Rydgren 2005a:vii). Betz argues that the emergence of 
populism is a response to the growing gap between what voters want and what politics can 
offer (Betz 2005). Eatwell finds proof of this in falling turnouts and lower share of votes 
going to mainstream parties, referring to the term originating in Germany, 
politikverdrossenheit (Eatwell 2003:51). Both Eatwell (2003) and Ignazi (2003, 2007) see 
falling legitimacy as a central reason for the endurance of the populist radical right. 
 
This trend is also evident in Central and Eastern Europe, through both quantitative and 
qualitative observations (Anastasakis 2000:23; Minkenberg 2000:175; Williams 1999:32; 
Eurobarometer 2007). As Williams writes, expectations were high after the collapse of 
communism and the lack of immediate progress has opened up a source of discontent that the 
populist radical right has tapped into. Zaslove adds to this by pointing out that the tensions 
from the transition and following democratization processes has provided a fertile background 
for populism (Zaslove 2008:326). Mudde also finds that populism is indeed a factor in Eastern 
European politics, but also that parties are treated quite differently, benefiting from the fact 
that political populism is a natural part of the mainstream political agenda (Mudde 2000b:43-
44).  
 
Of the various aspects traditionally used to explain PRR-voting I find the protest vote most 
difficult to direct geographically between WE and CEE. Historically, it has been a much 
emphasized aspect in the Western literature, but empirical studies show that the resentment is 
in fact bigger in CEE. Recent Eurobarometer surveys show that the percentage of respondents 
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who do not trust national governments and national parliaments is higher in the new member 
states (Eurobarometer 2007, 2008). This is also evident in earlier statistics which is closer in 
time to the dataset used in this thesis (Eurobarometer 2001) (see appendix). On the basis of 
the empirical results I believe the significance of protest voting to have the biggest potential in 
CEE seen in the light of the expectations after the fall of communism, although I will not be 
surprised if it turns out that the variable is significant in both regions.     
 
H2: PRR-parties in Central and Eastern Europe mobilize voters who are disillusioned with 
political elites to a larger degree than in Western Europe 
 
2.2.4 The European Union 
One of the most profound political changes in Europe over the last decades has been the 
intensified European integration. During the last 22 years the Union has incorporated a single 
market, EU citizenship, an increasingly active judicial branch, a common European currency, 
a directly elected parliament with expanded capabilities and last but not least, been through a 
massive expansion. Starting with the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986, the number of 
member states has increased with 17 states10, with further accession talks in process.  
 
Despite the fact that the EU has been a success on many areas, it is still seen by some as an 
elite project with a democratic deficit (Hix and Følledal 2005) and a popularly rejected 
constitution. This is partly why the European Union is not viewed very positively by the 
populist radical right (Mudde 2007:159f; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2006). However, this 
has not always been the case as parties were positive to European integration in the mid-
eighties. The turning point came with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and 
Hainsworth argues that European integration has become an increasingly important issue for 
the populist radical right in recent years (Hainsworth 2008:82; Mudde 2007:159).  
 
What is then the resistance against integration based on? Two main arguments can be made 
which explain the low level of support. First, given the predominance of nationhood, 
nationalism and national identity, it is no surprise that parties react to what they see as a 
supra-national body (Mudde 2007:159). Most PRR-parties are euroskeptics, basically positive 
to the basics of European integration, but skeptical towards the direction EU has taken. As 
                                                 
10
 1986: Spain, Portugal, 1995: Austria, Sweden, Finland, 2004: Cyprus, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, 2007: Bulgaria and Romenia 
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quoted by Hans-Georg Veen: “the supranational union of nationalist parties is a contradiction 
in itself, but not necessarily a complete one” (Veen in Mudde 2007:182).  
 
The second argument stems from the populist discourse of the populist radical right. Having 
built their image as a political parties which give “supremacy to the interests of the people” 
(Betz and Johnson 2004), the political distance from the people to Brussels is seen as 
problematic. Hainsworth note that PRR-parties tend to see European integration as a 
“bureaucratic and elitist phenomenon” with a top-down approach (Hainsworth 2008:82). The 
EU is often seen as an overarching scapegoat (Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007:32). 
 
A number of corruption scandals have also decreased trust in politicians, creating a grievance 
against contemporary politicians (Ivarsflaten 2008; Kitschelt 1995; Rydgren 2005b). Despite 
having distinctly younger democracies, contempt for politicians is also a feature in Central 
and Eastern European politics because the communist regimes created a divide between “the 
moral non-Communist people” and “the corrupt Communist elite”. This dichotomy is easily 
transferable to match the Western resentment of politics with the “moral civil society” against 
“the corrupt state” (Mudde 2000b:45). Still, the relatively short involvement11 with the EU in 
CEE also opens up the possibility of seeing the EU as a counterweight to incompetent 
national politicians, given the past troublesome decades on domestic grounds. The EU is also 
involved in more aspects in everyday life in WE than in CEE at the present point of time.  
 
H3: PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilize voters that are negative to the EU 
 
2.2.5 A silent counter-revolution? 
Is the populist radical right a silent counter-revolution to the shift in values and political styles 
as described by Ronald Inglehart (1977)? The original revolution is described by Inglehart as 
a process where values shift from a heavy emphasis on well-being and physical security 
towards more attention to the quality of life (Inglehart 1977:3). Connected to the value shift, it  
is plausible to think, that voters at the same time change their views on political issues. The 
traditional issues that are identified with post-materialism are environmental issues, quality of 
life, role of women etc. On the other hand, Inglehart is also aware of the contrasts between 
                                                 
11
 At the time of the data collection CEE states were not yet members of the EU, but it had been a political issue 
for some time due to the accession talks. I will get back to this in the subchapter on the data.  
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“new politics” and traditional values and norms and that it has often resulted in the creation of 
new parties (Inglehart 1977:13). 
 
Kitschelt and McGann is in line with Inglehart when he divides between industrial and post-
industrial societies (Inglehart 1977:21). They argue that post-industrial politics is 
characterized by the divide between the left-libertarians and right-authoritarians (Kitschelt 
and McGann 1995). Where the Green parties represent the left-libertarians, PRR-parties are 
on the opposite side of the party spectre. This is illustrated by environmental conflicts which 
is listed as one out of four specially salient issues along the “new left” – “new right” spectrum 
(Kitschelt and McGann 1995:20). 
 
Johan Veugelers identifies the same value change and following shift in political issues as the 
researchers above, but also emphasises the duality of post-materialist theory. The political 
spectre has not just tilted to the left, an equal reaction has happened on the far right end as 
well. As early as in 1981 Lipset observed that: 
 
“while postmaterialist tendencies have generated new sources of support for left from a 
segment of the more affluent and better educated, reactive social conservatism has helped 
recruit support for right-of-center parties from less privileged and less educated strata” (Lipset 
1981:521).  
 
Ivarsflaten summarizes the argument by concluding that voters feel that environmentalism has 
gone too far, gasoline has become too expensive and industries are weakened due to 
environmental demands by politicians. Therefore PRR-parties attract voters who feel that 
political intervention is unnecessary to protect the environment (Ivarsflaten 2008:6).  
Societies shifts toward post-materialist values when people experience what Inglehart calls 
“exceptional economic security” (Inglehart 1977:3). While the development in Central and 
Eastern Europe is heading in a positive direction it is unlikely that citizens in these countries 
have experienced the preconditions for post-material values to such a degree that it is 
sufficient to call for the reactions theoreticized in Western Europe. As a reaction to the 
increasing emphasis on post-materialist values I set forth my third hypothesis:  
 
H4: PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilise voters who feel that political financial 
involvement in environmental issues is unnecessary 
  23 
2.2.6. An authoritarian view on politics 
On January 5th 2006 the International Herald Tribune could report that two-thirds of the 
Russian population preferred a strong leader instead of a democratic government (IHT 2006). 
A popular account of Russian politics is the country’s fascination with strong leader, which is 
displayed through the popularity of former president Putin in contemporary Russia. The 
charismatic party leader of the LDPR, Vladimir Zhirinovsky has claimed that only a 
dictatorship can save Russia (Mudde 2007:150) and similar requests are made in Hungary 
(Toth and Grajczjar 2007:205). Though Zhirinovsky is among the most extreme politicians in 
Russia, and probably Europe as well, the question of how authoritarian attitudes fit with the 
populist radical right arises! 
 
Mudde is quick to point out that in the context of the populist radical right the meaning of the 
word authoritarianism is not the same as within the democratization literature, but follows the 
dominant tradition within social psychology. Referring to Theodor Adorno and the 
Frankfurter school, authoritarianism is interpreted as “a general disposition to glorify, to be 
subservient to and remain uncritical toward authoritative figures of the ingroup and to take an 
attitude of punishing outgroup figures in the name of some moral authority” (Adorno et.al in 
Mudde 2007:22). Following that line of reason, Mudde operationalizes authoritarianism as a 
belief in a strictly ordered society, where challenges to this authority is intolerable (Mudde 
2007:23).  
 
The authoritarian aspect is heavily emphasized by Kitschelt, who includes it in his winning 
formula for the radical populist right, saying that it stands for hierarchical arrangements in 
politics and a limited diversity in cultural expression (Kitschelt and McGann 1995:2). An 
important aspect within authoritarianism is a strong state, which might seem a bit 
contradictory to the parties traditional lassiz-faire approach to politics (Hainsworth 2000b:9).  
 
Where Western parties traditionally accept democracy as a principle, but object the direction 
liberal democracy is headed, flirtation with more authoritarian aspects is more accepted in 
Eastern Europe. Michael Minkenberg claims that the Eastern European parties are more 
reverse-oriented in that they are more anti-democratic. The logic behind the argument is that 
years under communist rule and the following transition period to democracy has created 
society that is more recipient of traditional authority and survival values. This contrast is well 
exemplified by the German case, where support for democracy as a form of government is 
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notably lower in the Eastern part than in the former West Germany (Fuchs 1999:131; 
Minkenberg 2000:188; 2002:358). The support for strong government is also supported by 
Miller et.al through their comparison of Central and Eastern European countries versus 
Britain (Miller et al. 1998:17).  
 
In Western parts of Europe, the emphasis seems to be more on the law and order aspects of 
authoritarianism. A key issue is the fight against crime and tougher penalties is a recurring 
theme in party programs (Mudde 2007:146-147). Rydgren sees this in relation to the 
increased salience of the socio-cultural cleavage explaining that it is a part of the “doctrinal 
and rhetorical core” (Rydgren 2002:27) 
 
Authoritarian views seem to have a central position in definitions of the populist radical right. 
That alone makes it interesting to test whether or not it is a uniting element, but the 
observations by Minkenberg makes it even more fruitful. He indicates that post-communist 
countries are more inclined to flirt with anti-democratic standpoints and that this is a result of 
the massive societal changes experienced in the last decades. If this is true, the desire for 
strong leadership on the expense of democratic governance should not be significant in 
Western Europe where the emphasis has focused more on law and order issues. With this in 
mind I set forth the following hypotheses:  
 
H5a: PRR-parties in Eastern and Central Europe mobilize voters who support strong 
leadership 
H5b: PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilize voters who support stronger reactions to 
violations of the law 
 
2.2.7 Economic changes 
The economy has a great influence on politics, an observation that is easily recognizable 
during the contemporary world-wide economic crisis. Since the groundbreaking “An 
economic theory of Democracy” by Anthony Downs (1957), a number of studies have been 
conducted that have confirmed the connection through empirical studies (Alvarez et al. 2000). 
According to Alvarez and colleagues, it should therefore not come as a surprise that 
perceptions of economic conditions by individual voters have a strong influence on the 
choices made by the same individual voters (Alvarez et al. 2000:238).  
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There is little doubt that big economic changes have taken place in Europe over the last 
decades. Already in 1992 did Mackie et.al note that Western countries were undergoing 
economic transformations that were nothing less than dramatic (Mackie et al. 1992). If we 
factor in the even more dramatic changes undertaken in Central and Eastern Europe with the 
transition from communism to market economy (Minkenberg 1994), it is clear that the 
economy is an issue that, probably even more than traditionally, has affected voters at the 
same time as the emergence of the populist radical right.  
 
The economy has been a popular issue in the research on the populist radical right. Two of the 
earlier classics by Betz (1994) and Kitschelt (1995), give the economy a central place in their 
theories. Betz sees PRR-parties as a reaction to the social-democratic welfare state, deemed 
unable to face new challenges stemming from increased globalization. As their answer to 
economic stagnation they proposed a radical neo-liberal economic agenda (Betz 1994:171). 
Kitschelt included a neo-liberal economy into his “winning formula”, pointing to many of the 
same reasons as Betz, that parties revolt against higher taxes and ever-increasing welfare-
states (Kitschelt and McGann 1995). Despite that in recent years several scholars have 
questioned or denied the necessity of right-wing economics (Carter 2005; Ivarsflaten 2005; 
Mudde 2007), it is still described as a predominant view by Mudde in his review of the 
economic literature of the populist radical right (Mudde 2007:120). This is not very surprising 
considering that they are, at least thought to be, located at the far right of the socio-economic 
left-right spectre. The logic here is that PRR-parties can be successful if they attract voters 
based on a neo-liberal message (Ivarsflaten 2008:4). These voters, on a general basis, prefer 
less state intervention and protectionism in the economic sphere.  
 
What is interesting is that while, according to Kitschelt and Betz, populist radical right voters 
in Western prefer less state intervention, the focus seems to be somewhat different in Central 
and Eastern Europe. The change from communism to capitalism has led to increasing 
inequality among citizens (Berglund et al. 2001:30). Thus, the attention is the opposite than in 
the West, with a red-brown alliance mixing nationalistic rhetoric with leftist political ideas, 
(Miller et al. 1998; Anastasakis 2000:26). The region is also more sceptical to privatization, as 
a consequence of the transition to capitalism riddled with corruption and patronage (Mudde 
2007:129). Radoslaw Markowski takes a very clear position against the domination of neo-
liberal economics in populist radical right politics. Referring explicitly to Kitschelt, he argues 
that parties are fundamentally different across regions as “CEEC parties are definitively 
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opting for state protectionism and economically leftist ideas. Neoliberal stances are totally 
missing” (Markowski 2002:28).  
 
Jan Fidrmuc detects a similar pattern in his research on the economics of voting in the former 
communist countries. He finds that the economy clearly played an important role in the first 
elections following the fall of communism. The economic reforms created winners and losers 
and thus also voters who either supported or opposed reforms. Fidrmuc identifies the winners 
as private entrepreneurs, urban residents and white-collar highly educated workers. The losers 
on the other hand are the unemployed, retirees, blue-collar workers and rural residents 
(Fidrmuc 2000:215). His description of “the losers” is very similar to the stereotype of the 
average PRR-voter (Mudde 2007) and goes well in hand with the comments made by the 
researchers mentioned above. This shows that there is a discrepancy in the view of economic 
preferences for PRR-parties.  
 
A different approach, taken by those who are not convinced about the vital position of neo-
liberal economics, show how parties are in favour of an extensive welfare state for those who 
belong to the nation in question (Mudde 2007:122). The SIREN Project also points to a “plea 
for a better welfare state” (Flecker et al. 2007:56). This line of reasoning is most often called 
“welfare chauvinism”, calling for an extensive welfare state for all those entitled to it. Those 
not entitled are the same enemies as elaborated in sub-chapter 2.3.1, namely immigrants and 
indigenous ethnic group (Mudde 2007:130f).  
 
Considering the unclear economic landscape when concerned with PRR-voting, the 
hypothesis will not have a direction but merely state that economic preferences mobilize 
PRR-voters.  The coefficient sign will reveal the direction of the variable. 
 
H6: Economic preferences mobilize voters for PRR parties 
 
2.3 A divided Europe? 
The following two sub-chapters present the leading arguments from two debates that have 
implications for the convergence of PRR-parties, and that are not necessarily connected to 
political issues. The goal is to show that while some argue for an increased convergence, there 
is not necessarily a theoretical agreement and the probability for a still divided Europe in 
terms of my research question is still very much present. The first sub-chapter looks at the 
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nationalism debate, placing the classical dichotomy by Hans Kohn up against more recent 
empirical findings and explaining how this has implications for the comparability of the 
populist radical right. The second sub-chapter looks at the converging effect of transnational 
party-group, especially those present in the European Parliament.   
 
2.3.1 Two forms of nationalism?  
The centrality of nationalism to PRR-parties makes it natural to look more closely at this term. 
One of the seminal contributors to the study of nationalism, Hans Kohn, argues in his 
celebrated work “The Idea of Nationalism” that there exists a dichotomy between a civic 
nationalism in Western Europe and an ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe (2005 [1944]). 
This was a controversial statement when published and recent contributions have questioned 
the validity of such a dichotomy (Hjern 2003; Kuzio 2002; Shulman 2002). André Liebich 
even claims that the ghost of Hans Kohn is haunting the study of nationalism (2006:579). 
However, other accounts by Greenfeld (1995) and Ignatieff (1993) support the tradition stated 
by Kohn.  
 
The argument put forward by Kohn relies on a historical account of nationalism, which did 
not develop as we know it today until the 1850s (Kohn 2005 [1944]:3; Smith 1986:138). 
Whereas the Renaissance and Reformation changed society in Western Europe, it did not 
have the same impact in Germany and Eastern Europe. In the West, nations were created as 
unions of citizens integrating around a political idea, but the German nationalism, less 
affected by the aforementioned historical events, did not find the same rallying point for a 
future society and looked backwards into its own past and myths to find the basis of their 
nationalism (Kohn 2005 [1944]:331/351). The divide is closely connected to the formation of 
the state. In Western Europe nationalism was mainly a political occurrence preceded by state 
formation, following the theories on state and nation-building by Stein Rokkan (Kohn 2005 
[1944]:329; Rokkan 1980). In Central and Eastern Europe, nationalism rose at a more 
backward stage of social and political development and the boundaries of the state and 
nationalism rarely coincided (Kohn 2005 [1944]:329).  
 
The political and social changes in Europe, involving the concepts of liberty, humanity and 
patriotism, deepened the differences between Western and Eastern Europe. Different 
interpretations led to a Western nationalism based upon liberal middle class concepts pointing 
towards democracy and an Eastern nationalism based upon pre-enlightenment concepts 
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leading towards exclusiveness (Kohn 2005 [1944]:455-457). A closer examination of this 
point reveals the resemblance to the much later work of Jürgen Habermas on a constitutional 
patriotism based around the civic ideals described by Kohn (Habermas 1992). Habermas 
defines the nation in two variants, either a “nation of citizens” or an “ethnic nation”. The 
former is a product of politics and the collective will built up on choice and contracts. The 
latter however is pre-political and a product of history and myth (Habermas et al. 1998).   
 
The dichotomy is further elaborated by Anthony Smith in his presentation of the territorial 
and the ethnic nation. Smith argues that the emergence of nations was brought forward by a 
triple revolution originating in Western Europe and spreading across the continent during a 
long time-span. The revolutions were “in the sphere of the division of labour, a revolution in 
the control of administration, and a revolution in cultural co-ordination (Smith 1986:131). The 
first revolution created the sense of a nationalism to integrate various actors into a unified 
national economic system. The second, as a result of increasing need of a streamlined 
bureaucratic to maximize resources at a minimum cost and the third, cultural co-ordination, 
had the state replace the ecclesiastical authority, thus gaining more control over education 
(Smith 1986:131-134). 
 
Through these three revolutions, Western polities gradually emerged from ethnic to territorial 
nations. In the East however, the revolutions came at a much later point in time and very 
unevenly. The existing polities did already consist of distinct and separate ethnic communities, 
more often than not under the domination of a core ethnie, like the Ottoman, Austrian and 
Russian empires. This leads to a larger emphasis on ethnic criteria “crossed with memories of 
former statehoods in the area” (Smith 1986:141).  
 
A territorial nation takes its basis from a sense of territory with the logic of moving from 
“state-to-nation”. The state as a territory is both sovereign, yet strictly bounded, along the 
lines of Benedict Anderson’s definition of the nation as an imagined community – “both 
inherently limited and sovereign”(1983:15). Other elements in territorial nationalism are 
legality – a community of laws and legal institutions, citizenship – absolute membership and 
legal equality of rights and duties, and a common culture (Smith 1986:135-136).  
 
The ethnic nation is the reverse process of the territorial nation in the way that it goes from 
“nation-to-state”. Nations were gradually formed on the basis of pre-existing ethnic ties, 
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producing a core of genealogy, populism, customs, dialects and nativism. Inclusion here is not 
based on citizenship, but belonging to the ethnic group constituting the nation. In contrast to 
the territorial nation, these nations tend to substitute legal codes and institutions with customs 
and dialects, elevating historical elements to official status (Smith 1986:137-138).  
 
Following the dichotomy developed by Kohn and elaborated by Smith, the line of reasoning is 
that there is a difference in which nationalism prevails in Western Europe versus the Central 
and Eastern Europe. This understanding is further backed up by more recent accounts from 
leading researchers on nationalism. Roger Brubaker writes that there is little chance of the 
civic notion to prevail in Eastern Europe given the “pervasively institutionalized 
understandings of nationality as fundamentally ethno-cultural rather than political, as sharply 
distinct from citizenship, and as grounding claims to ownership of polities” (Brubaker 
1996:105). Brubaker’s account is also backed by the statement by George Schopflin who 
links nationalism with communism. Under the Soviet-era, resistance against communism 
became a national project and under these circumstances “it was very difficult for any civic 
dimension of nationhood to emerge” given “the strongly ethnic character of nationhood and 
state legitimation” in the region (both quotes from Schopflin 1996:153). Stefan Auer, while 
warning against a simplistic dichotomy of nationalism, identifies the battle between liberal 
nationalism and nationalism driven by xenophobia and chauvinism as vital for the survival of 
consolidated democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (Auer 2000:244).  
 
In recent years several researchers have questioned the validity of Kohn’s dichotomy 
(Björklund 2006; Hjern 2003; Kuzio 2002; Shulman 2002). The criticism either points to the 
gross oversimplification of the divide or the fact that empirical research is unable to reveal 
any clear geographical divide between Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
A theoretical argument is made by Taras Kuzio who argues that the framework presented by 
Kohn is badly flawed on six points. The most central point made by Kohn is that all states in 
the West share “cultural horizons, values, identities and historical myths in a common history 
that is the nation”(Kuzio 2002:24). Furthermore the ignorance of anti-democratic cases in the 
West and civic elements in the East makes the geographical distinction flawed. Kohn ignores 
several states from Western Europe and lumps together the nationalisms he dislikes into the 
Eastern category. Third and fourth, the geographical division of nationalism, which Kuzio 
describes as artificial, ignores ethnic and territorial violence in the West as well as the fact 
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that Western states were not always fully inclusive of social and ethnic groups (Kuzio 
2002:25-26). The fifth point is that Kohn ignores the fact that nationalism in the East can 
evolve from ethnic to civic, as it did in the West. Finally, Kuzio writes that nation-building 
elements have been positively viewed in the West, but portrayed as negative in the East. He 
points for instance to how France, as a civic nation, also homogenizes their inhabitants (Kuzio 
2002:28).  
 
Using an alternative framework building on Robert Dahl’s definition of a civic state12, Kuzio 
argues that Western states only became civic in the 1960s and that the new states in Central 
and Eastern Europe has gone through this process after 1989. This contradicts the time span 
used by Kohn, who argues that the change from ethnic to civic occurred in the 1850s (Kohn 
2005 [1944]:3). Kuzio holds that evolution from ethnic to civic has little to do with geography, 
but is a process initiated by international institutions and democratic consolidation. Both 
Western and Eastern states have used histories and myths, further weakening the logic of 
“either-or” (Kuzio 2002:32-36).  
 
While Kuzio works at a theoretical level, several empirical studies have been conducted in 
recent years. They do not use the alternative framework presented by Kuzio, but provide 
results that add more questions to the continued validity of Kohn’s dichotomy (Björklund 
2006; Hjern 2003; Shulman 2002).  
 
Shulman, in his study of fifteen countries, finds that the classic divide between West/civic and 
East/ethnic is a “gross oversimplification” (Shulman 2002:583). While some analyses support 
the dichotomy, an equal number do not, and overall the data suggest that Eastern Europe is 
not strongly culturally positioned. Cultural conceptions of nationhood is also present in long-
time democratic and civic states in the West (Shulman 2002:583).  
 
Similar findings are discovered by Hjern, who concludes that “there seems to be support for 
the revisionist standpoint (Hjern 2003:427). Frederika Björklunds study of Latvia, Lithuania 
and Poland also provides criticism towards Kohn. Despite finding clear indications of an 
ethnic understanding of nationalism in Latvia this is not true for the other two countries, 
proving that Eastern Europe is not ethnic as a unit (Björklund 2006:112-113).  
                                                 
12
 Free and fair elections, an inclusive suffrage and the right to run for office (Dahl 1971) 
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What are the implications for of the nationalism debate for PRR-parties? It is clear that 
nationalism is a central concept for these parties (Eatwell 2000:412), and if nationalism is 
distinctly different in the West from the East, then it is theoretically plausible that parties also 
are different. Despite the fact that recent empirical results questions the divide, PRR-parties in 
Eastern Europe seems to have a more extreme focus than their Western counterparts, which is 
evident in the treatment of minorities (Hockenos 1993; Merkl 2003:3/15; Mudde 2000a:277; 
Williams 1999:32). While all PRR- parties drift towards ethnic nationalism, the Central and 
Eastern version is much more extreme due to a more radicalized political context and are thus 
able to use stronger and more extreme rhetoric. Central and Eastern parties are also to a larger 
degree associated with mainstream politics than in Western Europe (Mudde 2005a). So while 
the two different forms of nationalism do not necessarily separate the nationalisms of PRR-
parties, the perceived duality of mainstream nationalism in the two regions creates distinctly 
different political climates to operate in.   
 
2.3.2 The converging effect of transnational party groups 
A central point in the argumentation for a pan-European analysis is the convergence through 
the European Union, given the homogenizing effects of membership (Mudde 2007:3). With 
Central and Eastern European countries gaining accession in 2004, it is natural to assume that 
the converging effect is more a process for the new member countries to adapt the existing 
acquis communitaire, than a process where two equal parts convergence towards the centre. 
To serve as a reminder of the accession process, the Copenhagen Criteria highlights some of 
the areas where the new member states had to adapt Union policies. New members must have 
stable institutions that guarantee for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and for 
protection of minorities. In addition to these fundamental rights, several demands concerning 
market economy and ability to perform its duties as a member state is fundamental for the 
entrance into the European Union (European Council 1993).  
 
It is interesting to observe that minority protection is mentioned in the Copenhagen Criteria as 
they often constitute the “enemy” according to Mudde (Mudde 2007:69). Is it plausible to 
assume that EU impact is the same at party level as it is at state level? Dorota Dadowska 
writes that “although there is a general agreement that the EU effects the polities of Central 
and Eastern European countries, the impact of EU enlargement on the political parties 
remains more uncertain to determine” (Dakowska 2007:3). Has Western parties influenced 
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their Eastern counterparts to such degree that they can no longer be separated? If so, is this 
also true for populist radical parties?  
 
The main form of transnational party cooperation in Europe takes place through party 
federations and party groups in the European Parliament. Transnational party cooperation is 
an old concept, but in a European context it has intensified with the increased role of the 
directly elected European Parliament. It has been the most effective way to improve capacity 
in order to handle the new institutional environment present in the ever-changing union (Hix 
and Lord 1997:2). Despite a volatile European party system, an argument can be made that a 
stable core has emerged around the EPP-ED, PES and ALDE 13  (Delsoldato 2002:272). 
Despite varying member parties, the core of these three groups can ideologically be labeled as 
Christian Democrats/Conservatives (EPP), Social democratic (PES) and liberal (ALDE).  
 
In the decade leading up to the accession European party federations increased the attention 
given to the Central and Eastern Europe (Spirova 2008:795). Already in 1996 did the EPP-ED 
offer observer status, followed by associate status in 1998, to potential new partners from 
candidate countries (Dakowska 2002:280-1). 
 
Hix and Lord argue that one of the main purposes for a political organization is to agree on 
common goals,  pointing to an emerging network among the Christian Democrats, Socialist 
and Liberals on some of the major political issues on the medium and long-term agenda of the 
EU (Hix and Lord 1997:67-73). The reflections by Hix and Lord are shared by Paul Lewis, 
who are determined that Europeanization has served as a guiding principle for the 
transformation in Central and Eastern Europe, especially for political parties and party 
systems (Lewis 2007a:1). Parties in Eastern Europe have clearly been based on Western 
ideals and transnational party groups or equivalent associations in the European Parliament 
has played a large role in shaping new parties after the accession in 2004, through both 
offering various advantages and apply conditions for acception (Lewis 2007a:1; Pridham 
2001:195-6).  
 
                                                 
13
 European People’s Party and European Democrats, Party of European Socialists and European Liberal 
Democrat and Reform Party. Present day names are used, but all three groups have changed their name reflecting 
additions to the group as the EU expanded.  
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Empirical examples of the direct pressure by European party groups can be seen in several 
countries. In 1999, the EPP-ED put severe pressure on the Latvian Party for Homeland and 
Freedom (TB/LNNK) and scrutinized closely the leaders’ support to the Meciar regime in 
Slovakia and their stance on minority rights. The EPP-ED working group on Central and 
Eastern Europe made public that the party group would cease all contact with the TB/LNNK 
if they declined to support a new law that would guarantee minority rights for Russians in 
Latvia (Dakowska 2002:283). Others cases are how the EPP-ED used associated German 
political foundations as their agents, promoting values and positions of the Christian 
Democrat federation and encouraging interlocutors to apply the EPP-ED. Similar procedures 
are also undertaken by foundations associated with the PES (Dakowska 2002:287-290). The 
effect is seen in the composition of party programs of Central and Eastern European parties, 
which bears a clear resemblance to the programs of their new friends in the West (Dakowska 
2002:290; 2007:15; Lewis 2007a:9; Pridham 2001:196).  
 
Researchers do not exclusively praise the influence of European party groups, they also point 
to some obvious pitfalls.  Several see it as problematic that Central and Eastern party systems 
still are not completely stable and Lewis argues that only the Hungarian the Czech party 
systems can be called stable (Lewis 2007a:8; Pridham 2001:179). As emphasized by Hix and 
Lord, the need for oversized majorities in the Union tends to suspend party politics, as all 
major European party families prefer to agree in order to reach a clear majority (Hix and Lord 
1997:17). 
 
Another major point clearly relevant for this thesis concerns the ideological differences 
between Western and Central and Eastern Europe. Giorgia Delsoldato argues that the 
emerging transnational intraparty relationships must be seen in light of political cleavages. It 
is difficult to obtain a clear picture of party systems and the comparability of cleavages in new 
and old member states. Due to the importance of the politico-cultural cleavage in addition to 
the socioeconomic cleavages prevailing in Western Europe, two different political left and 
right can exist in the same party system (Delsoldato 2002:281-283). Pridham also sees the 
deficiencies, as Western ideological concepts are very broad and may not be transferable to 
Central and Eastern Europe. Similar concerns are shared by Olson, who questions the 
similarity of party systems based on the differences in issue alignments (Olson 1998; Pridham 
1981).  
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PRR-parties have during their existence changed from being initially positive to the European 
Union to a point where a large majority of parties now are Euro-skeptics or even Euro-rejects. 
Due to the central placement of nationalism in their ideology it is not surprising how, as the 
Union consistently grew more supranational, especially after the Maastricht Treaty in 1992,  
PRR-parties changed their view on the Union, instead preferring a different direction based on 
a number of equally diffusing concepts, such as “Europe of Nations, “Europe of the 
Fatherlands” and so on (Mudde 2007:158-167). The various concepts also represent an 
ideological division between potential parties for a transnational right-wing group. A 
disagreement between the Vlaams Belang (VB) and Front National (FN), on whether to 
support ethnic nationalism based on the ethnic communities of Europe or state nationalism 
based on the existing European states, has also been a source of conflict (Mudde 2007:167). 
 
The various right-wing parties of the European Parliament have made several attempts at 
creating a stable and lasting party federation. However, they have experienced a number of 
difficulties such as electoral thresholds, a continuing rotation of parties and lack of 
cooperation (Mudde 2007:177-181). The first right-wing group in the EP was “Group of the 
European Right” in the period between 1984-1989 with FN and Italian Social Movement 
(MSI) as the largest parties. The group was dominated by the FN leader, Jean Marie Le Pen 
and the French party has consistently proved to be the most eager supporter of a “nationalist 
international” (Mudde 2007:174-8). In the next period between 1989 and 1994 Le Pen 
decided to go along with the German Republikaner (Rep), after he feuded with the MSI over 
South Tyro.  Internal difficulties ended the group de facto in 1991/2 (Hix and Lord 1997:107; 
Mudde 2007:178). The inclusion of Austria in 1996 proved to be a disappointment as the FPÖ 
refused to participate in a party alliance, leaving the populist radical right MEPs in a state of 
turmoil in the period between 1994 and 1999. In June 1999 a new group of unattached MEPs 
founded the “Technical Group for Non-Attached Members – Mixed Group” (TDI). This 
attempt also proved to be futile as it was dissolved twice by the EP and finally for good in 
October 2001 (Mudde 2007:179).  
 
The potential for a more homogenous right-wing group increased with the accession of new 
member states in 2004. In the following EP elections eight parties belonging to the larger 
right-wing family obtained seats, 30 in total, enough to compose a separate political group. 
But instead the MEPs started off in three different groups, Independence/Democracy, Union 
for Europe of the Nations or unattached (EU.int 2008). But the acceptance of Romania and 
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Bulgaria as EU members in 2007 increased the number of MEPs associated with the populist 
radical right (Abramsohn 2007). Shortly after the expansion plans for a new right-wing group 
intensified and on the 9th of January 2007 “Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty” was born 
under the leadership of MEP Bruno Gollnisch of the FN (Mahony 2007a). But as with all the 
previous attempts at group formation the ITS folded after the Romanian MEPs from PRM14 
accused Allesandra Mussolini of being xenophobic. No longer fulfilling the minimum number 
of MEPs, the group was dissolved in November the same year (Mahony 2007b; Banks 2007).  
Outside of the EP the contact between parties has been mainly at an individual level and while 
numerous attempts have been made to establish contact, they have more often than not failed. 
This has made John Loyd argue that no “populist international with closely similar parties 
exists” (Loyd 2003:88). The most recent attempt at creating a transnational party federation 
has been “Euronat”, initiated by Le Pen and the FN with the appeal: “nationalists of all 
countries unite” (Mudde 2007:158). But also the Euronat has lived what Mudde describes as a 
“shadowy existence (Mudde 2007:176).  
 
While transnational party groups on a general level seems to have had a converging effect on 
parties in Central and Eastern Europe, it is equally clear that the consistent resources and 
efforts put down by mainstream party groups has lacked from the populist radical right (Lewis 
2007b:187). Ideological and personal differences have too many times come in the way for 
stable and long lasting co-operation. It is therefore plausible to assume that whatever 
convergence the European Union has provided for party systems on Central and Eastern 
Europe not necessarily can be transferred to also account for PRR-parties.  
 
2.4 Summary of the theoretical argument 
Throughout this chapter I have presented the theoretical arguments for why a pan-European 
analysis of PRR-parties can not be taken for granted. The chapter started off with a discussion 
of terminology and definitions where I highlighted a definitional conflict between van der 
Brug and colleagues and Cas Mudde on the definition of PRR-parties. The role of 
immigration for Western European PRR-parties and its presence in most definitions in the 
previous literature creates problems when we know that immigration is not a politicized issue 
in Central and Eastern Europe. While calling for a more elaborate discussion on the pan-
                                                 
14
 Greater Romania Party 
  36 
European approach, I acknowledge at the same time the overall quality in “Populist radical 
right parties in Europe” (Mudde 2007) and  have used the PRR-term throughout the thesis.  
 
The second section deals with the political issues most commonly connected with PRR-
parties. Following the line of thought that major societal changes are necessary to create a 
niche for a new party, hypotheses are constructed around a number of issues. The issues are 
primarily drawn from the literature on Western European parties, but I have added theoretical 
insight on several issues thought to be more prominent in Central and Eastern Europe, such as 
extremist attitudes, a more authoritarian leadership and the possibility for leftist economic 
policies. All hypotheses, except for H6 on economic preferences, have been given a 
geographical direction.  
 
Following the political issues, I have pointed to two areas that on a theoretical level questions 
the convergence between Western European and Central and Eastern European PRR-parties. 
Two different forms of nationalism may have created different political atmospheres, which 
can contribute to the more radical and extreme political discourse in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Also, the presence of a transnational party group, connected to the European 
Parliament, has more or less been non-existing for PRR-parties.  
 
Having presented the theoretical framework, the next chapter will continue by outlining the 
methodology, operationalization and data for the analysis of the thesis.  
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3.      Methodology, data and operationalizations 
 
According to King, Keohane and Verba (1994:9) the content of scientific research is the 
methods and rules of research. The importance of being aware of the most suitable method 
and be able to conduct it is therefore immense. This chapter will first account for my 
methodological choices, then proceed to cover the data used in the thesis. The final part of the 
chapter describes the measurement validity and operationalization of the variables.  
 
3.1 Research strategy: Quantitative method  
Every research project must be explicit on the goal of the study (King et al. 1994:75); is it to 
give descriptive or causal inferences? My thesis aims to discover causal inferences on which 
issues that mobilize PRR-voters in Europe. In order to do so, I have chosen to use a 
quantitative method. Methodological approaches within political science are normally divided 
into two separate camps. You can either adapt a small-N in-depth, qualitative approach, or a 
large-N generalizing, quantitative approach. The quantitative approach can again be broken 
down into cross-sectional, panel data and multi-level analysis. The debate between 
quantitative and qualitative method is a heated discussion and Lijphart comments that “if at 
all possible one should generally use the statistical (or perhaps even the experimental method 
instead of the weaker comparative method” (Lijphart 1971:685), I am, however, just going to 
argue that a quantitative approach is more suitable for my thesis.  
 
The nature of my research question constitutes a large-N study. When dealing with ten 
different countries, parties and 7 000 plus observations, it is necessary to use statistical 
techniques in order to reveal which issues mobilize PRR-voters in Europe. Quantitative 
method is superior when it comes to drawing conclusions based on a large population (George 
and Bennett 2004:30-31; Mahoney 2003:354). Reducing the number of cases would weaken 
the thesis when placing the thesis in relations to Mudde (2007) and is not an alternative. To 
have many observations is important as my focus is on voters, – a large-N quantity, if wanting 
to generalize.  
 
A statistical analysis can also more accurately provide a measure of how strong the impact of 
an independent variable is on the dependent variable. While qualitative methods may be more 
appropriate in theory-generating studies, statistical methods are better at estimating causal 
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effects and effect on a large spectrum of observations (George and Bennett 2004:25). Since 
my goal is to perform an empirical test of Mudde’s pan-European argument, a quantitative 
approach is well suited.  
 
A potential pitfall with a quantitative approach and an advantage with qualitative method is 
the closeness to both research objects and concepts (George and Bennett 2004:17). Charles 
Ragin is of the understanding that by using a quantitative approach the researchers misses out 
on an important process of learning to know the different observations, creating a longer 
distance between researcher and objects of research (Ragin 2004:128). While this may be true, 
quantitative approaches can remedy these shortcomings by obtaining a keen theoretical 
insight, and be observant of guidelines to achieve good validity (Adcock and Collier 2001:174; 
King et al. 1994).  
 
On the basis of a desire to generalize by testing theory on a large number of observations, I 
am of the opinion that a quantitative approach is best suited for my thesis. In the following 
sub-chapter I will explain in detail my method of choice.  
 
3.2 Logistic regression 
My dependent variable is a dichotomy, where a respondent can either have voted for a PRR-
party or not. In such cases, logistic regression or probit regression are the most used statistical 
techniques. The two forms of binary regression are very similar, the difference being slightly 
different forms on the regression curve and a different way of transforming the dependent 
variable. Differences in results are very small and the selection of logistic regression ahead of 
probit regression should not effect the results (Skog 2004:390).  
 
Though the fundamental line of thought of logistic and OLS-regression is similar, they have 
important differences at detail level (Skog 2004:352). The most important difference between 
logistic regression and multiple regressions is that the binary structure of the dependent 
variable has properties that violate the assumptions of OLS regression. The error term of a 
discrete variable follows the binomial distribution instead of the normal distribution; this 
invalidates statistical testing based on assumptions of normality. Second, the variance of a 
dichotomous variable is not constant, creating instances of heteroscedasticity. Logistic 
regression also predicts probability for an event to occur within the range of 0 and 1, which is 
not necessary in OLS regression (Hair et al. 2005:356-7).  
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3.2.1 Recoding into logit-values 
Since the binary variable only has two outcomes, 0 and 1, the predicted value must fall within 
the same range. To express this range, logistic regression uses the logistic curve to represent 
the relationship between the dependent variable and independent variables. Given a positive 
coefficient, when the value on the independent variable decreases, the probability approaches 
0, but never reaches it. When the value on the independent value increases, the probability 
approaches 1, but never reaches it. This gives the relationship a non-linear form.  
 
Figure 1 Illustration of non-linearity 
 
 
To prevent the probabilities from exceeding the range between 0 and 1, and to obtain a metric 
variable with both negative and positive values, the probability value is transformed in a two-
step process. First the probability is restated as odds – the ratio of the probability of the two 
potential outcomes (Hair et al. 2005:359).  
 
Odds =  Probi ÷ (1 – Probi). 
 
A simple example serves to illustrate the relationship between probability and odds. If you 
have ten cases, with eight of them being successful and two of them being a failure. The 
probability for  success is 0.8 (8 ÷ 10). The odds would then be:  
 
0.8 ÷ (1-0.8) = 4.0 
 
The odds of success are 4.0 or four times more likely to have a success than a failure. A 
probability of 0.5 – equal chance – results in odds of 1.0. Thus if the odds are over 1.0 it 
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corresponds to a probability above 0.5 and vice versa with an odds under 1.0 (Hair et al. 
2005:359). This way the odds represent a metric variable that can always be reverted back 
into a probability between 0 and 1. However, odds can only have values between 0 and 
infinite positive values. This is solved through the logit value which is found by taking the 
logarithm of the odds.  
Logit = log (Probi ÷ (1 – Probi)) 
 
Odds greater than 1.0 will have a positive logit value and odds less than 1.0 will have a 
negative logit value. Through the transformation from probabilities, through odds and ending 
up with a logit value, the dependent variable is now metric and can have both positive and 
negative values and still be transformed back into a probability between 0 and 1 (Hair et al. 
2005:360).  
 
3.2.2 Model estimation  
The nonlinearity present in the dichotomous dependent variable prevents us from using the 
least squares method known from multiple regression. Instead, logistic regression makes use 
of the maximum likelihood procedure. The procedure maximizes the likelihood for an event to 
occur. It is a method that produces measures of goodness-of-fit of the estimated model. The 
most basic measure is the likelihood value. Logistic regression measures the estimation fit 
through taking the value of – 2 times the log of the likelihood value, referred to as -2LL. A 
perfect fit would be give a likelihood of 1 and a -2LL of 0. Thus, the lower -2LL the better 
model fit. The -2LL value can be used to compare between models, comparable to the R2 
measure in multiple regression. Other measures called named Pseudo R2 measures give a 
value that can also be used to compare models. The measure used in this thesis, adjusted 
McFadden’s R ², compares the model fit with the actual observations on a range between 0 
and 1, while adjusting for the number of variables added (Long and Freese 2006:109). The 
higher score, the better the model explains the actual observations. The fit is measured 
through a likelihood ratio, where the likelihood value in the model with just the intercept is 
divided on the model with independent variables included. A value very close to 0 indicates 
that the model does not fit better than a horizontal line, while a value close to 1 indicates a 
perfect fit. A fourth way to measure the goodness-of-fit is through a classification matrix that 
gives you a hit ratio of how well the model is able to predict observations into the right 
category on the dependent variable (0 or 1) (Hair et al. 2005:361-363).  However, since the 
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sample of observations will be different for my models, depending on the regional focus, the 
model comparisons do not contribute much to compare between regions. All values will be 
reported, but cannot be used to compare across samples.  
 
3.2.3 Interpreting coefficients 
Compared to OLS regression, the interpretation of the coefficients is not as straightforward. 
Due to the nonlinear structure, the probability of the dependent variable does not increase by 
the same value for each increase of one on the independent variable. Because of the 
multiplicative logic, the effect of the independent variable depends on which level it is at. It is 
also affected by x-values on other independent variables included in the model. This is 
illustrated by figure 1 (p.39), where the probability at first does not increase very much, then 
takes a steep climb at -2 before it flattens while approaching a probability of 1.    
 
As explained in section 3.2.1, the probability has been recoded into odds and then logit values. 
This complicates the interpretation of the original coefficients as they only tell us the change 
in logit values. They can however tell us the direction of the relationship through the sign of 
the coefficient. In order to make interpretation easier statistical programs include an 
exponentiated coefficient which takes the anti-log of the original coefficient and thus reflects 
changes in odds-ratios instead of the logit-value (Hair et al. 2005:364). Through taking the 
anti-log of the original coefficients the exponentiated coefficient is actually stated in odds. 
Exponentiated coefficients above 1.0 will represent a positive relationship whereas 
coefficients under 1.0 will represent a negative relationship15. 
 
Table 1 Coefficient interpretation  
Logistic coefficient Reflects changes in…. 
Original Logit (logged odds) 
Exponentiated  Odds (elogit) 
Source: (Hair et al. 2005) 
 
The magnitude of change is thus best measured through the exponentiated coefficients as 
systematized in the following expression: 
 
Percentage change in odds = (Exponentiated coefficienti – 1.0) x 100 
                                                 
15
 This is because odds of 1.0 is reversed back into a probability of .50 where each outcome is equally probable.  
 Prob = Odds ÷ (1 + Odds) → Prob = 1.0 ÷ (1+1.0) = .50   
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As mentioned, it is important to note that in logistic regression the impact of the independent 
variables is multiplicative not additive. The new odds is therefore calculated through the 
multiplicative equation underneath 
 
New odds value = Old odds value x Exponentiated coefficient x Change in independent 
variable  
 
In a situation where the old odds are 1.0 when the independent variable has a value of 6.5 and 
the exponentiated coefficient is 2.5, an increase on the independent variable of 2 units would 
give new odds of 516. As established the old odds of 1.0 would give a probability of .50, 
whereas a two unit increase on the independent variable would give a probability of .83317, an 
increase in probability of 33,3 per cent. Note that because of the non-linearity another 
increase of two units would not add another 33,3 per cent chance as that would make the 
probability greater than 100 per cent. Instead the multiplicative logic gives a new odds of 2518, 
which in turn gives a probability of .9619, an increase of roughly 12 per cent from the first 
calculation (Hair et al. 2005:364-366). 
 
The method used to interpret dummy variables is slightly different. Since it only has two 
values, the dummy tells us whether or not a characteristic is present or absent. In this case the 
exponentiated coefficient represents the level of the dependent variable for the represented 
group versus the omitted. It is therefore of great importance to know which group is coded 
what. The relationship between the two categories can be stated as follows:  
 
Oddsrepresented category = Exponentiated coefficient x Oddsreference category 
 
In the case of gender, if women are coded as 1 and the exponentiated coefficient is 1.25, then 
females have 25 per cent higher odds than males (1.25-1 = .25). A negative exponentiated 
coefficient would indicate that females have a lower odds than men (Hair et al. 2005:367).  
 
                                                 
16
 New odds = 1 x 2,5 x 2 = 5 
17
 Prob = 5 ÷ (1+5) = .833 
18
 New odds = 5 x 2,5 x 2 = 25 
19
 Prob = 25 ÷ (1+25) = .96 
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Interpreting the coefficients in a meaningful way is a problem with logistic regression. Of the 
three different measures20 and ways to interpret coefficients, each have different advantages 
and disadvantages. The impact of logit values and odds-ratios does not vary depending on the 
x-value, but tell little about the substantive effect due to the complicated mathematical logic 
behind the values. Probabilities, on the other hand, are easier to interpret in a meaningful way, 
but vary depending on the value on both its own x-axis and those of other independent 
variables.  
 
When variables are measured on different scales or different unites in linear regression, we 
use standardized coefficients in order to compare the strength between variables. A similar 
process can be made in logistic regression, but it requires a lengthy process of calculation.  
 
In multiple regression the standardized coefficients (beta) is calculated by using the 
unstandardized coefficient and the standard deviation of X and Y in the following relationship 
 
y
x
S
Sb ⋅= 1β  
The transformation from unstandardized coefficients to standardized coefficients causes a 
change in measuring units from the original units of the variables to standard deviations. The 
standardized coefficient indicates how many standard deviations of change in the dependent 
variable is associated with an increase of one standard deviations in the independent variable 
(Menard 2002:45). Thus variables with different units are now measured on the same scale of 
units.  
 
In logistic regression is not as easy to transform unstandardized coefficients into standardized 
coefficients. This is due to the fact that in logistic regression it is not the value of Y, but the 
probability when Y has a specific value that is predicted. As recalled from section 3.2.1 the 
dependent variable in logistic regression is not the actual Y-value, but logit (Y). From the 
transformation in linear regression we saw that the standard deviation is an important measure 
in order to calculate standardized coefficients, unfortunately it is not possible to directly 
calculate the standard deviation of logit values (Menard 2002:46). However, an equation 
presented by Scott Menard shows how the standardized coefficients can be calculated by 
                                                 
20
 Probabilities, odds-ratios and logit-values 
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using the predicted values of logit (y) and the explained variance, R². In regression, the 
variance explained (R²) is calculated by taking the regression sum of squares (SSR) and 
divide it by the total sum of squares (SST). Menard explains that by dividing both by the 
sample size, the variance explained equals the variance of the predicted values of the 
dependent variable divided by the variance of the dependent variable.  
 
22
ˆ
2 /)/)(/(/ yy SSNSSTNSSRSSTSSRR ===  
 
Furthermore this equation can be rearranged into  
 
22
ˆ
2 / RSS yy =  
 
By substituting all the Y values with logit (Y) values we get an expression for the variance of 
logit (Y) and furthermore by taking the square root of the variance we now find ourselves 
with an expression of the standard deviation of logit (Y) that can be inserted into the equation 
below that finally calculates the standard coefficients.   
 
)ˆ(log1
22
)ˆ(log1 /))()((//))(( yitxyitx SRSbRSSb ==β  
 
In this equation b1 is the unstandardized logistic coefficient, Sx is the standard deviation of the 
independent variable X, 2 )ˆ(log yitS is the standard deviation of the of logit )ˆ(Y  , and R² is the 
explained variance (Menard 2002:46). This is a process that is done automatically in the 
statistical package STATA, through the spost-command, which will be used for my analysis. 
 
The standardized coefficients are interpreted in the same manner as in linear regression. An 
increase of one standard deviation in the independent variable X is associated with a standard 
deviation change in logit (Y). This makes it easier to compare the impact of the independent 
variables. In his example, Menard shows how the perceived magnitudes based on odds-ratio 
and logit values turned out to be quite different when measured through standardized 
coefficients (Menard 2002:47-48) 
 
  45 
Though standardized coefficients appear to be very useful it must be noted that its use has 
been the subject of debate (Bring 1994; Greenfeld 1995; Newman and Browner 1991). While 
standardized coefficients are used in the thesis they are one of several statistical measures that 
are used and the results of the analysis does not exclusively rest on the standardized 
coefficients. The standardized coefficients are also only meaningful for the metric variables 
and will be discussed for those exclusively.  
 
3.2.4 Assumptions of logistic regression 
Even though a number of assumptions connected to the normal distribution of error terms, as 
known from OLS regression, do no apply for logistic regression, three important assumptions 
must be fulfilled.  
 
First, the relationship between the variables must be S-shaped, i.e. non-linear, and linear when 
described through the logit scale. The form of the regression curve can be calculated 
statistically by using the Hosmer-Lemeshow-test. If the H-L-test is significant there are 
significant differences between actual and predicted values, the model is not S-shaped, thus 
the lower significance the better (Hair et al. 2005:372; Skog 2004:383-385). Problems can be 
remedied through different strategies like constructing a polynomial variable, including 
dummy variables or perform a non-linear recoding of the independent variable in question 
(Skog 2004:385).  
 
The second assumption, that the error terms are uncorrelated with each other, is in most cases 
satisfied if the data have been selected through a random sample, which is the case for my 
data. It is more relevant in longitudinal studies and multi-level studies where one case makes 
several observations when you follow it over time. However, it may still be an issue between 
observations within the same country. The third and final assumption is that the independent 
variable and the error term must be uncorrelated (Skog 2004:380). Such a correlation would 
generally indicate a misspecification in terms of bias, inefficiency or inaccurate inferences 
(Menard 2002:71).  
 
3.3 Data 
The datasets considered for this thesis have been European Social Survey (ESS), International 
Social Survey Programme (ISSP), European Election Studies (EES), Eurobarometer (EB) and 
European Values Study (EVS). After thorough consideration I decided to use the European 
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Value Study as my main data source. This decision was based on several criteria. First of all it 
included party choice as a variable. Second, it was the best data set available both when it 
came to the number of observations, relevant parties and suitable variables.  
 
The European Values Study is the European branch of the World Value Study and has been 
collected in three separate rounds21 with a fourth round due to be released late in 2009. The 
EVS is a large-scale, cross-national longitudinal survey research program carried out by the 
European Values Study Foundation. The last round from 1999/2000 consisted of data from 33 
European countries, covering a variety of topics. Some of the most central questions raised by 
the survey are “do Europeans share common values?, are values changing in Europe and, if so, 
in what directions” (EVS 2009; Gesis 2009). The EVS has been used in a large number of 
articles by noted scholars such as Seymour Martin Lipset, Ronald Inglehart and Juan Linz 
(EVS 2009). In addition it has also been used in previous research on the PRR (Karvonen 
1997).  
 
The complete dataset contains 39 797 respondents with national samples varying from 967 in 
Iceland to 2500 in Russia. In total 74 per cent of the interviews were done face-to-face while 
the remaining 26 per cent were done by phone. With the exception of Greece (which is not 
included in my analysis) all surveys were conducted by professional survey organizations. In 
all non-English speaking countries the questionnaire was translated into the native tongue. 
The respondents were selected through random sampling of the entire adult population with 
the exceptions noted in the footnote22. The precise sampling methods are available in the main 
questionnaire from the EVS web page. The average response rate is 62.9 per cent. However, a 
few countries were missing from the overview in the codebook or reported the non-response 
rate in age-divided categories, making it impossible to calculate it into the average. For the 
countries used in my analysis the response rate was higher than the overall average at 66.7 per 
cent, but this figure is missing 2 out of 11 countries due to the reasons mentioned above. Still, 
the response rate is acceptable, but not exceptionally good. The data are not weighted, but the 
number of respondents is adjusted according to the size of the country.  
 
 
                                                 
21
 1981, 1990, 1999/2000 
22
 Iceland 18-80 years of age Sweden 18-76 years of age, Romania – non-Romanian citizens excluded, Slovenia 
– institutionalized people i.e. prisons, monasteries, mental institutions etc 
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3.3.1  My use of the EVS 
The complete dataset contains observations from 33 countries, but my thesis will only include 
data from 10 countries, 5 from WE and 5 from CEE. As I position my thesis close to Cas 
Mudde’s “Populist radical right parties in Europe”, it seems natural to only include the parties 
present in his analysis to make my empirical test of his pan-European argument as accurate as 
possible. Mudde identifies twelve parties, of which the EVS contains observations for eleven. 
Another reason for leaving out countries without PRR-parties from the analysis is the 
difference between electoral breakthrough and electoral persistence of the parties (Mudde 
2007). Such an analysis would have to include a more overall picture of both supply and 
demand-side variables and is beyond the scope of this thesis. The dataset is cross-sectional 
only containing data from the last round.  
 
Table 2 PRR-parties identified by Mudde 
 
Countries Party High score  Included in thesis 
Austria Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) 26, 9 (1999) Yes 
Belgium Front national (Belge) (FNb) 6,9 (1995) Yes 
Belgium Vlaams Belang (VB) 16,8 (2003) Yes 
Croatia Hrvatska strnaka prava (HSP) 6,8 (1992) Yes 
Denmark Dansk Folkeparti (DFP) 13,2 (2005) Yes 
France Front national (FN) 14,9 (1997) Yes 
Germany Die Republikaner (REP) 2,1 (1990)ª Yes 
Hungary Magyar Ignazsàg ès Èlet Pàrtja (MIEP) 5,5 (1998) Yes 
Poland Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR) 8,0 (2005) No 
Romania Partidul Románia Mare (PRM) 19,5 (2000) Yes 
Russia Liberal’no-demokratischeskoi partii Rossii (LDPR) 22,9 (1993) Yes 
Slovakia Slovenská národná strana (SNS 11,7 (2006) Yes 
Notes: ª The REP gained 7, 1 % in the (nationwide) European Elections of 1989 
Source: (Mudde 2007:44) 
 
This selection leaves me with a total of 15088 observations from 10 countries, further reduced 
to 11442 when leaving out those who have not answered which party they would vote for. Out 
of these 11442 there are 691 PRR-observations. 411 out of 6223 come from WE and 280 out 
of 5219 come from CEE (see appendix).  Respondents who have answered that they did not 
vote or cast a blank vote is included in the non-PRR segment as they are not motivated by 
issues fronted by PRR-parties, and as such have deemed them not an alternative.  
 
Unfortunately, the number of observations from each party is not sufficient to undertake 
separate analyses by country. In order to overcome this problem the observations are put 
together in two separate groups, either in a WE-bloc or a CEE-bloc. This is not ideal as there 
are most likely some national differences between countries (Anastasakis 2000; Schain et al. 
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2002). However, the inclusion of national dummy variables can reveal whether there is a 
significant difference after the national variation has been accounted for.   
 
3.3.2 Reliability and validity 
Two central concepts in all social science research are reliability and validity. Achieving good 
levels of reliability and validity is highlighted by King and colleagues (1994:25-26) as crucial 
elements of how to obtain good data quality. Reliability is, when thought of, fairly easy to 
achieve in quantitative analyses. It is simply put a measure of how reliable your data are. 
When you apply the same operations in the same way on the same data, the results should 
also remain the same (King et al. 1994:25-26).  
 
There are primarily two types of reliability; stability and equivalence (Grønmo 2004:222). 
Stability refers to the degree of accordance between data-collections gathered at different 
points of time with the same tools. Equivalence is based on accordance between independent 
data collections at the same time (Grønmo 2004:222-223). Data would thus have a better 
reliability if several independent researchers obtained the same results with different data.  
 
Overall, the reliability shows to what degree variations in the data depends on aspects of the 
data collection or whether there is actual variation.  
 
Validity is a question about whether we measure what we want to do or not. Again the term is 
divided into two main types. External validity measures whether or not the observations are 
true for the entire population, while internal validity is whether or not the operationalizations 
represent the theoretical concept (Midtbø 2007:25). Measuring validity is more or less a 
question of judgment. But there are also different quantitative techniques, like constructing 
indexes that can be applied to increase the internal validity.  
 
I consider the reliability of my data to be good. The collection procedure is documented in the 
EVS codebook and webpage and is thus replicable. As a test I checked the mean placement on 
a left-right scale in France for the EVS and the ESS and the difference was 0.13 (4.88 vs. 
4.75), indicating good equivalent reliability. Through random sampling the observations in 
the dataset, and without any systematized bias, it also has good external validity. Discussions 
of internal validity will be discussed at length in the following sub-chapter and will not be 
covered here.  
  49 
3.4 Operationalizations 
In all research the validity of the variables are of primary importance. The following sub-
chapters will account for how I have operationalized the variables and how I see them to have 
validity 
 
For several of the variables I have constructed indexes to obtain better measurement of a 
phenomenon. First, I have used factor analysis to conduct a preliminary test if the variables 
load on the same dimension or not. The MSO-test should be above .500 and the Bartlett’s test 
of sphericity should be significant. Finally, to ensure that the new variables based on the index 
has adequate reliability a Cronbach Alpha test is performed on the original variables, 
checking for internal consistency. The generally accepted level is .70 and .60 for exploratory 
research. However, as the reliability increases along with the number of variables, an index 
with few variables might yield a value of around .60 and still be acceptable (Hair et al. 
2005:137). All the relevant statistical output is available in the appendix.  
 
3.4.1 The dependent variable 
The goal of my thesis is to shed new light on whether or not PRR-parties in WE and CEE 
mobilize voters on the same political issues. The easiest way to measure this is to see which 
issues make voters place a vote for a certain party during elections. The independent variable 
is therefore constructed around the question “which party would you vote for?” The question 
is applicable to all countries and has good measurement validity as it is very straightforward 
and extremely difficult to misinterpret. In order to create a dummy variable to represent the 
choice between a PRR-party and a non-PRR party the variable has been recoded. All 
observations of one of the parties listed in table 1 are coded as 1 – PRR, while every other 
party including those who indicated that they would deliberately vote blank or not post a vote, 
are coded as 0 – Non-PRR.  
 
3.4.2 The independent variables 
In the following section I will outline the operationalization of the independent variables. In 
addition to the variables given grounds for, the chapter includes a few traditional control 
variables with a brief explanation for why they are potentially important for the PRR-vote. All 
subchapters will also include a consideration of the measurement validity of the variables.  
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3.4.3 Who are the others 
The question of who constitutes “the others” is of vital importance in any analysis of the PRR. 
While the consensus for WE parties is that immigration is the no.1 issue, indigenous groups 
seem to attract the most negative attention in CE (Mudde 2007). The theoretical section 
identified three different hypotheses. First, that immigration can both mobilize voters on the 
account of a cultural threat and through a decrease in job security. Second, I argue that the 
discourse around “the others” in CEE is much more radical, intolerant and biological than in 
WE.  
 
To measure the perceived cultural threat I use Q75 that asks what immigrants should do 
culturally when arriving in a new country. If, for the greater good of society it is better if 
immigrants maintain their distinct customs and traditions, the respondent has been coded as 0. 
If for the greater good of society it is better if immigrants do not maintain their distinct 
customs and traditions but take over the customs of the country, the respondent has been 
coded as 1. The variable is an original dichotomous variable but the values have been recoded 
from 1 and 2 to 0 and 1.  
 
The question reveals whether or not the respondents see the cultural aspects of immigration as 
damaging. If wanting immigrants to assimilate into the national culture, it reflects the focus 
on cultural nativism identified by Betz and Johnson, where the emphasis is on the future of a 
European identity and Western value system (2004:84). I find the variable to represent the 
theoretical element of cultural racism in a good way, thus achieving good internal validity.  
 
To measure perceived job insecurity I use Q 74 asking how the respondents feel about people 
from less developed countries coming here to work. The variable has four different choices 
ranging from 1 – let anyone come who wants in to 4 – prohibit people coming here from other 
countries. In order to be able to use it in a regression analysis the variable has been recoded 
into a dummy where the two most positive responses have been coded 0 and the two most 
negative responses on foreign workers being coded 1.  
 
The third variable is an index meant to measure what I have argued is a more radical,  
biological and intolerant form of expressing negativity against outsiders. It is  
constructed out of a set of variables asking if you would feel negative about being  
neighbor to a certain type of people. The dataset contains a range of groupings but I  
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have chosen homosexuals, gypsies, Jews and people of a different race. The  
neighbor-variables have previously been used by Karvonen to represent world-views and  
attitudes of PRR-voters in a number of Western European countries (Karvonen 1997). All 
four groups are identified by Mudde as outsiders in the eyes of PRR-parties (Mudde 2007). 
   
All four questions used (Q7 I, L, M and N) are natural dummy variables with the  
alternatives mentioned (1) and not mentioned (0). In the additive index the scale would  
be from 0 - never mentioned to 4 - always mentioned for the four variables. That would  
make the scale unsuitable for regression analysis and so the index has been recoded into  
a dummy where the 0-2 has been coded as 0 - not extremist and 3-4 have been coded 1 -  
extremist. This way the respondents have to give a positive response on at least three 
variables before being coded as someone with extremist attitudes.  
 
The KMO for the index is .721 and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity is significant at the  
.000-level. The Cronbach Alpha is also over the minimum value reporting at .670,  
indicating that the index has good internal validity. 
 
3.4.4 The protest vote 
The protest element of the PRR-parties is prominent in most of the research. On an overall 
basis the political trust and satisfaction in WE is on the decline (Pharr and Putnam 2000), with 
the same poor prospect becoming increasingly visible in CEE. With falling turnouts and a 
lower share of votes going to mainstream parties (Eatwell 2003:51), PRR-parties represent a 
fresh alternative less affected by the politikerverdrossenheit. Political elites are more than 
anywhere else found in national parliaments around Europe. The variable chosen to measure 
if PRR-voters are mobilized on resentment for the established political elites concerns the 
level of confidence in national parliaments. Ideally, it would have been combined with levels 
of confidence in government and/or political parties, but unfortunately variables suitable for 
such measures are not included in the EVS. However, in most countries, especially those with 
a parliamentary system, the link between parliament and government is close, so that the 
confidence in the parliament should not differ very much from the confidence in government.  
 
A potential drawback with the variable is that parliament is more restricted than politicians as 
a whole. However I believe that, much like the relationship between government and 
parliament, a lack of confidence in politicians as a whole is also visible in an assessment of 
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politicians in the parliament. The exact wording of the variable is how much confidence in: 
parliament (Q58g). Originally the variable had four different categories ranging from a great 
deal (1) to none at all (4). In order to be able to use it in the analysis it has been recoded into a 
dummy variable. Those who expressed that they either had a great deal or quite a lot of 
confidence has been given the value 0 labelled confidence. Those who expressed not very 
much or none at all have been given the value 1 labelled no confidence.  
 
3.4.5 The European Union 
A large problem for the European Union is the lack of confidence among European citizens. It 
is part of a more general problem of resentment for politics and political actors. To 
operationalize the theoretical argument that a lack of confidence in the EU and the ideas of a 
supranational union mobilize PRR-voters, I have chosen a relatively straightforward variable. 
The variable how much confidence in: the European Union (Q58j) originally had four 
variables ranging from a great deal (1) to none at all (4). However, this is not enough values 
to treat it as a metric variable. Therefore it has been recoded into a dummy in order to use it in 
the analysis. Those who expressed either a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the EU 
have been given the value 0 labelled confidence. Those who expressed not very much or none 
at all confidence in the EU have been given the value 1 labelled no confidence.  
 
A potential problem with the EU-variable is that the dataset is from 1999/2000, four years 
before Slovakia, Hungary and Romania became members, while Russia and Croatia are still 
not members. A valid question is whether the data simply are outdated. While the data are 
nine years old, with five years of EU membership for Slovakia, Hungary and Romania having 
taken place in the period, they applied for membership in the mid-nineties and should thus 
have knowledge of the European Union before accession. On a theoretical level PRR-voters 
should still oppose membership in the European Union on the grounds of the ideological clash 
between nationalism and the supranational elements of the EU.  
 
3.4.6 A silent counter-revolution?  
Protection of the environment is an important trait connected to post-materialism, and green 
parties are noted to be political by-products of this value-shift (Ignazi 2007:201; Inglehart 
1977). A PRR backlash against the environmental focus is therefore plausible (Ivarsflaten 
2008; Lipset 1981). The variables chosen to operationalize a silent counter-revolution are 
therefore connected to environmentalism. If PRR-parties mobilize on resistance to the value-
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shift described by Inglehart, they should voice their dissatisfaction with the increasing 
emphasis on the environment.  
 
Two variables were used in an index to create a more comprehensive variable. The variables 
give part of income against environmental pollution (Q3A) and increase taxes to prevent 
environmental pollution (Q3B) created the new environment variable. While quite similar at first 
sight, the two variables concerns two slightly different areas of environmental protection. 
Variable Q3a asks whether or not one would voluntarily give up a part of the income in order 
to protect the environment, whereas variable Q3b sees the state take a more active role 
through taxation in order to protect the environment. The new variable allows for a 
combination of these on a larger scale. The KMO is .50, which is on the edge between 
acceptable and unacceptable. However, two variables are the minimum in a factor analysis 
and the KMO value suffers from this, therefore I deem it to be acceptable. The Bartlett’s test 
was highly significant and the Cronbach Alpha was .805, indicating good reliability for the 
new variable.  
 
The two original variables were coded from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). The 
new variable (additative) ranges from 1 (most positive to the environment) to 7 (most 
negative to the environment). Though the variable only has seven values it is enough for it to 
be treated as a metric variable (Midtbø 2007).  
 
3.4.7 An authoritarian view on politics 
Mudde operationalize authoritarianism in this sense as a belief in a strictly ordered society, 
where challenges to this authority is intolerable (Mudde 2007:23). This view is also reflected 
in the much earlier classic by Kitschelt, where he explains authoritarianism as a hierarchical 
arrangement of politics (Kitschelt and McGann 1995:2). Another important aspect with 
authoritarianism, which is highlighted by Hainsworth, is the emphasis on a strong state 
(Hainsworth 2000b:9). This seems a bit odd at first considering the perceived focus on a 
lassiz-faire approach to politics. The theoretical discussion revealed a difference between the 
two regions on the acceptance of democracy. Where democracy is established as “the only 
game in town” in WE, Minkenberg claims that parties from CEE are more “reverse-oriented” 
in that they are more anti-democratic (Minkenberg 2000:188; 2002:358). Years under 
communist rule has created a society that is more recipient of traditional authority and 
survival, leading up to the popularized story of how Russia needs a strong leader. The variable 
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connected to hypothesis 5a is as following: is it a good having a strong leader who does not 
have to bother with parliament and elections? (Q62a). The variable should be well able to 
measure any nostalgic authoritarian feelings in CEE. Originally, it had four values ranging 
from very good (1) to very bad (4), but it has been recoded into a dummy. Those who 
answered very good and fairly good have been given the value 1 labelled positive to strong 
leader while those who answered fairly bad and very bad have been given the value 0 labelled 
negative to strong leader. The dichotomization is easier to defend due to the lack of a middle 
category making the two categories distinctly separate.  
 
Unfortunately, the EVS does not contain any variable that I have deemed to be appropriate to 
measure hypothesis 5b - PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilize voters who support 
stronger reactions to violations of the law. This is a clear weakness of the thesis and the 
implications of this must be taken into account in the conclusion. I am aware that relevant 
variables are available in similar datasets, but an overall evaluation of the available data in 
relations to the thesis found the EVS to be the best choice for the thesis.  
 
3.4.8 Economic changes 
The importance of economic preferences in electoral research is not to be underestimated and 
the economy has had a central place in research on PRR-parties for many years, especially 
due to the emphasis given by Betz (1994) and Kitschelt (1995). However, as pointed out by 
Mudde (2007:121) the attention within the literature has started to question the neo-liberal 
economics normally associated with the PRR, instead pointing to nationalistic tendencies 
within the economy. With the pan-European perspective in mind, Radoslaw Markowski is 
quite clear that the traditional right-wing economics is not present in the former communist 
countries at all (Markowski 2002).  
 
In order to test the mobilizing effect of economic preferences, I have constructed an index 
consisting of three variables. A potential flaw would be to measure left-right placement solely 
on the basis of a ten-point left-to-right scale. That would lead to the same validity problems 
experienced by Norris in her research (2005). The problem with this is that it is dependent 
upon a consistent understanding of the scale. My analysis includes parties from ten very 
different countries. The differences are especially noticeable within the economic sphere as 
half of the countries only have fifteen years of experience with market economy. In addition 
there are warnings about the understanding of the left-right scale in CEE countries 
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(Anastasakis 2000:26). Several argue that the ideological picture in Central and Eastern 
Europe is very unclear and is not a copy of the Western, thus making it more difficult to apply 
terms like leftist and rightist economy (Bohrer II  et al. 2000; Kitschelt et al. 1999). Therefore 
my index is based on concrete questions about the role of the state in business and the market 
in general.  
 
Keeping in mind that the index is a continuum going from left to right with an open 
formulated hypothesis it is important that the index has good validity in both directions.  
 
David Harvey defines neoliberal economy as a theory of political economy that:  
 
“proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong 
private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and 
preserve an institutional framework appropriate for such practices” (Harvey 2005:2).  
 
Furthermore state intervention should be kept at a minimum as the market should serve as an 
undisturbed arena of competition (Harvey 2005:26).  
 
I argue that my index have good internal validity for rightist economic preferences based on 
the definition by Harvey on neo-liberalism given above. The questions cover key areas such 
as competition as a means to achieve success (54c), the position of the state in regards to the 
market (54d) and individual responsibility/entrepreneurship (54a). This indicates that the 
index has good internal validity for rightist economic preferences.  
 
The opposite statements, representing the left end of the index, should ideally represent a 
more active role on behalf of the state, especially in terms of a better welfare system and more 
control over the market.  The opposite angle to individual responsibility (Q54a) is a much 
more active role on behalf of the state in relation to its citizens. For the state to ensure that 
everyone is provided for, it is dependent on a well-functioning welfare system. Among the 
different welfare systems present in WE, Kleinman identifies the Scandinavian and the 
Anglo-Saxon models as the ones with the largest presence of the state (Kleinman 2002). An 
additional bonus with this variable is that its emphasis on the state is very useful when taking 
the former Communist systems into account. As claimed by Minkenberg certain CEE parties 
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are reverse-oriented, nurturing a nostalgic view of the Communist past. In this system, the 
state indeed had a very active role in ensuring that everyone were provided for, as this is a 
basic theoretical element of the ideology. Considering the historical element the variable 
should achieve good validity in CEE countries, where the extreme left value indicates moving 
towards the past.  
 
In WE, a very rough division can be made between the Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon 
models on one side and the Mediterranean and Corporative models on the other side. The 
major differences being that the first two rely on the state, whereas the latter two rely on 
private insurance and a larger role for the family in the care-taking of relatives (Kleinman 
2002). With the left-right dichotomy being well-known in WE, the variable is able to 
represent different views on the involvement of the state in providing for citizens, the higher 
value on the 1-10 scale, the closer to a larger and active state-driven welfare state. That is the 
goal of many PRR-parties and should thus theoretically also be the goal of their voters if we 
follow the arguments of Mudde (2007:125-132). I feel that the variable has good 
measurement validity in both directions, ranging from complete state responsibility for the 
well-being of citizens to a complete individual responsibility.  
 
The second variable (Q54c) measures the opinion of whether competition leads to success or 
if it brings out the worst in people. In the neo-liberal sense competition is one of the basic 
elements of market economy. However, opponents and sceptics to free competition make a 
point of accusing too much competition for lowering the quality in order to chase even bigger 
profits. This view is today perhaps most present in relations to privatization of the welfare 
state (Velferdsstaten.no 2009). Following their arguments the focus on competition may come 
at the expense of more important values.  
 
Within mainstream Keynesian economics, state intervention is warranted to correct basic 
flaws in a free market economy. The principal difficulties are ensuring continuous full 
employment and controlling inflation. These problems provide a rational for state 
involvement in the economy and market (Stilwell 2006:357). The original variable Q54d 
measures whether or not the state should control firms more effectively. A stronger control of 
firms, the major players in a market economy, thus indicates a stronger interference in the 
economy and market on a general basis.  
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I have argued that also the leftist views presented in questions Q54 a-c-d represent a useful 
contrast in economic standpoints to the rightist alternatives. This makes the index able to 
answer the open hypothesis as the sign of the coefficient reveals whether PRR-voters prefer 
right or left economics and if it has a significant impact at all. 
 
All three questions are answered on a 1-10 scale, where one is the most rightist answer and 10 
is the most leftist answer. The KMO for the index is .598 and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
is significant at .000-level. The reliability of the index is questionable with a Cronbach Alpha 
value at .516, which is under the desired value of .6. However, the low number of variables in 
the index and the good match between the variables and theoretical definition makes using the 
index defendable in my view. Since all the variables have a scale from 1-10 the new scale is 
additive going from three (1+1+1) to 30 (10+10+10). In order to make the interpretation 
easier the variable has been recoded to have a scale going from one to twenty-eight, with one 
being the most leftist view and twenty-eight being the most rightist view.  
 
3.4.9 Control variables and interaction terms 
In order to prevent the independent variables from being more significant than they should, I 
include a number of control variables. Though, less interesting from a theoretical point of 
view, they could complement the independent variables of interest in the final analysis 
(Midtbø 2007:31). The analysis will include four control variables, which all are very 
traditional in the sense that they cover the most important demographic aspects, and are 
usually included in electoral research. In addition to that they are also routinely highlighted as 
important aspects when describing the characteristics of a PRR-voter. I will also include 
dummy variables for all countries to check for variation between countries inside the two 
main blocks of WE and CEE.  
 
Differences between genders occur all the time in social sciences. This is also true for the 
PRR-literature. A traditional view has been that men are more likely to vote for a PRR-party 
than women. The percentages tends to be two-thirds male and one-third female (Givens 2004). 
A general overview by Mudde reveals that a gender gap exists in practically all European 
countries (Mudde 2007:111). The variable is a dummy with female (1) and male (0). The 
content of the variable has not been recoded, but I changed the values from 1 and 2 to the 
aforementioned values. Gender is a straightforward issue and I believe that the variable has 
good validity.  
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The second control variable is age. Does the likelihood for placing a PRR-vote increase or 
decrease by age? A survey of the German Republikaner showed that the younger age cohorts 
were the most likely to vote for the Republikaner rather than a traditional mainstream right-
party (Lubbers and Scheepers 2000:75). This view is supported by Betz, who says that PRR-
parties on a general level have drawn younger voters, as these are not yet tied by tradition and 
are more volatile in their party choice. Similar findings are also reported by Givens (2005:60). 
The variable has been recoded from year of birth to the actual age, making it a metric variable. 
 
The third control variable is education. The tabloid image of a PRR-voter is a young male 
with little education, however this might be an oversimplified picture of the relative diverse 
PRR-electorate (Mudde 2007).  In the French case, Nonna Mayer discovers that the Front 
National electorate tends to be less educated (Mayer in Givens 2005:58). According to 
Charles Westin, education leads to a more rational view on life, one that leaves little room for 
ideas such as racism (Westin 2003:119). Following this line of thought education should not 
encourage PRR-voting. The variable ranges from 1-8, making it a metric variable suitable for 
multiple regression where 1 is the least education and 8 is the most education.  
 
The final control variable asks whether the respondent is employed or not. The subject of 
unemployment is controversial in the literature with contradictory results (Mudde 2007:206). 
Jackman and Volpert (1996) find a significant correlation using macro-data, but Golder (2003) 
comes to a different conclusion. In his analysis unemployment is only significant when used 
in an interaction term with immigration. At the micro-level, status as unemployed is 
connected to the general theme of resentment that PRR-parties are thought to profit from. 
Those who report that they are unemployed have been assigned the value 1, while all others 
(employed, students, pensioners, voluntary unemployed etc) have been assigned the value 0. I 
believe the variable to have good validity.  
 
The thesis wants to discover whether or not there are differences in the political issues that 
mobilize PRR-voters in WE and CEE. However, it would be utopian to believe that the two 
blocks are internally homogenous and researchers also question if cross-country research is 
possible (Anastasakis 2000; Schain et al. 2002). Therefore it is necessary to check for national 
variation before drawing inferences about differences between WE and CEE. The possibility 
of a multi-level analysis is excluded due to a low number of observations at level 2 (countries). 
Instead I include dummy variables for all ten countries and am able through an Wald-test to 
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reveal if there are significant differences between countries as well as regions. All the 
variables are coded 0 for “non-country x” and 1 for “country x”.  
 
Interaction terms are included in model 6 in order to reveal whether or not there are 
significant differences between WE and CEE. Models 4 and 5 provide results exclusively for 
the two regions, but by including interaction terms and running all observations in the same 
model, I am able to reveal significant differences between WE and CEE. If a collective Wald-
test including the original variable and the interaction term is significant, the results identified 
in models 4 and 5 will be more robust. The interaction term is created by taking the original 
variables and multiplying it with a region dummy coded 0 for CEE and 1 for WE.  
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4 Analysis 
 
 
I will start by presenting descriptive data on all variables and comment briefly on them. 
Thereafter I will begin constructing the logistic regression model. The first model will only 
contain the dependent variable and country dummies, in order to reveal whether or not there 
are differences between countries that must be controlled for in the final model. The second 
model adds the control variables before the third model proceeds by adding the independent 
variables of interest. Then I will conduct separate analyses for Western Europe and Central 
and Eastern Europe to identify differences both between regions, but also compared to the 
pan-European model. Finally, a model including interaction terms will tell if the differences 
identified in the regional model are statistically significant.  
  
4.1 Descriptive data 
 
I will comment briefly on the variables, concentrating on the number of observations, mean 
and standard deviation, although the standard deviation makes most sense for the metric 
variables. The mean difference between WE and CEE is also included, a positive difference 
means a higher value in WE whereas a negative difference means a higher average in CEE. 
Only the most interesting figures will be commented on.  
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Variable N Mean Std.dev Min Max  WE  CEE Diff. 
Party 11442 .07 .238 0 1 .07 .05 .02 
Region 15088 .54 .499 0 1 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Lack of confidence - EU 12959 .59 .492 0 1 .41 .41 .0 
Lack of confidence - Parliament 14277 .66 .473 0 1 .40 .26 .14 
Environment – no financial support 14002 4.20 1.742 1 7 4.42 3.93 .49 
Strong leader 13704 .29 .454 0 1 .24 .36 -.12 
Cultural resistance – Immigration 12910 .66 .474 0 1 .76 .53 .23 
Employment resistance - Immigration 14437 .58 .493 0 1 .59 .58 .01 
Extreme attitudes 13860 .25 .433 0 1 .15 .39 -.24 
Economic preferences 13747 16.72 5.954 1 28 17.61 15.62 1.99 
Age 15077 46.95 17.142 16 102 47.73 46.05 1.68 
Female 15088 .54 .498 0 1 .54 .55 -.01 
Education 14959 4.48 2.136 1 8 4.26 4.72 -.46 
Unemployment 15002 .079 .269 0 1 .067 .092 -.025 
 
The dependent variable Party has 11442 observations, 3646 observations less than the total 
dataset. This represents the maximum of observations included in the analysis. The mean 
of .07 tells us that the number of non-PRR voters greatly exceeds the number of PRR-voters. 
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The mean difference between WE and CEE is small, .02, indicating that there are slightly 
more PRR-voters in WE than in CEE.  
 
The two variables connected to political disillusionment, Lack of confidence - EU and Lack of 
confidence Parliament both reveal that a majority of respondents lack confidence in the 
respective institutions with the mean being .59 for EU and .66 for the national Parliaments. It 
is interesting to note that on average, national parliaments have lower levels of confidence 
than the European Union.  
 
For Environment – no financial support, the mean value is unexpectedly lower in CEE, 
indicating a more positive attitude towards paying taxes in order to preserve the environment. 
This is surprising, as one would expect CEE-citizens to be less post-materialist than in WE 
based on the prerequisite of economic security (Inglehart 1977:3) 
 
Cultural resistance – Immigration and Employment resistance - Immigration concerns 
attitudes towards immigration/immigrants where a mean value above .5 would indicate a 
majority of restrictive attitudes. Somewhat surprisingly, this is the case for both variables. 
Considering the low number of PRR-voters in the analysis when compared to the overall 
number, this implies that attitudes towards immigration/immigrants on a general basis is quite 
restrictive in Europe. When the mean values are broken down to region-level, a clear 
difference between regions with regards to the Cultural resistance - Immigration variable is 
visible. It is surprising to see such a high mean value for WE, a region that often is stressed as 
being tolerant.  
 
Extremist attitudes has a mean value of .249. The difference in means between this variable 
and the Immigration-variables, points in the direction of Extremist attitudes indeed being 
more extremist. If the mean had been about the same as for the immigration-variables it could 
have been argued that all three variables were at the same attitude-level, but the lower average 
value tells us that fewer respondents have extremist thoughts. On a descriptive level is seems 
like the view of “the other” (Mudde 2007) differs from the cultural aspect in WE to the 
extremist view in CEE.  
 
The Economic preferences variable is the one with the most values, ranging from 1 to 28, 
with the highest value indicating the strongest preference for right-wing economics. The mean 
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value for all respondents is 16.72, indicating that the average placement is just to the right of 
the centre if we visualize the 1-28 range as a left-right axis. A standard deviation of 5.94 
indicates a relatively big dispersion on the variable.  
 
Table 4 Significance testing of means – CEE subtracted from WE  
 
Variable  T-value Sig.level Mean difference 
Lack of confidence – EU -.16 .868 .0 
Lack of confidence – Parliament 18.16 .000 .14 
Environment – no financial support -16.59 .000 .49 
Strong leader 15.08 .000 -.12 
Cultural resistance – Immigration -28.87 .000 .23 
Employment resistance – Immigration -1.32 .188 .01 
Extreme attitudes 25.99 .000 -.24 
Economic preferences -19.71 .000 1.99 
 
A negative t-value corresponds to a higher mean value in Western Europe. The table above 
shows that there are significant differences between the means for the independent variables 
of interest in Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe. All variables, except Lack of 
confidence – EU and Cultural resistance to immigration, have significant differences in the 
mean between the two regions. Although this does not confirm that PRR-parties mobilize on 
different issues, it serves to strengthen the assumption that such a difference exists between 
Western and Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
4.2 Model 1: The effect on PRR-voting in pan-Europe – country dummies only 
I begin to construct the pan-European model, by first adding country dummies to the analysis. 
Even though the focus of the thesis is to test which political issues that mobilize PRR-voters, 
it is necessary to control for differences between countries in the analysis. It is very likely that 
the national context has an effect on the party choice, and the inclusion of country dummies is 
able to test if such a difference is statistically significant. This will be conducted by using the 
Wald test and the Likelihood Ratio-test to examine if the null-hypothesis can be rejected. In 
this case the null-hypothesis will be that there are no differences between countries. The tests 
measure whether difference between models are a coincidence or a result of actual differences, 
a significant value enables us to reject the null hypothesis (Skog 2004:374).  
 
The model includes nine country-dummies with Croatia being the reference category. The 
coefficients in the model explains whether or not the variable has a significant difference 
when compared to the reference category and is thus not very interesting for the research 
question and will subsequently not be commented on. Considering the large number of 
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respondents .05-level will be the desired cut-off point for significant results. One-tailed tests 
were considered for some of the variables, but they were either insignificant regardless of a 
one-tailed test, or not theoretically suitable for one-tailed tests  
 
Table 5 Model 1:The effect on PRR-voting in Pan-Europe – country dummies only 
Variable Coef. Z P>|z|   Odds ratio Std.Coeff. 
France -.367 -1.39 .166 .692 -.058 
Germany -.907 -3.25 .001* .404   -.162 
Austria .1.72 8.03 .000* 5.582    .261 
Belgium .626 2.78 .005* 1.871 .104     
Denmark .131 0.51 .610 1.141 .018     
Slovakia .699 3.06 .002* 2.012 .107     
Hungary -.758 -2.31 .021* .468 -.098     
Romania .195 .75 .456 1.215 .025     
Russia .447 2.01 .044* 1.563 .084     
Constant -3.181 -15.89    
LR chi2(9) 370.00 HL chi2(7) 0.00   
Prob > chi2 0.000 Prob > chi2 1.000   
McFaddens Adj. R² .067 -2LL 4848.5518   
N = 11442      
*   Significant at the .05-level (two-tailed) 
 
The model with only the country dummies does not explain very much. The McFadden’s Adj. 
R² is .067. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test is far from significant, indicating that the model fits 
the logistic curve. The -2LL value is 4848.5518 and is noted for future comparison with larger 
models. The coefficients, though not of great importance at this stage, must be interpreted in 
relation to the reference category.  
 
What is important at this stage is whether the country dummies collectively are significant, 
making it possible to reject the null-hypothesis and conclude that there exist significant 
differences between the countries included in the analysis that must be controlled for.  
 
Table 6 Wald-test & LR-test of country differences 
Wald-test  LR-test  
Chi2(9) 355.84 Chi2(9) 370.00 
Prob > chi2 0.000 Prob > chi2 0.000 
 
Both tests show a significant value, meaning that the null-hypothesis, no variation between 
countries, is rejected. The reason for doing this is to control for country specific factors that 
may influence the results. As a consequence of the significant results, the country dummies 
must be included in the larger models to control for this variation.  
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4.3 Model 2: The effect on  PRR-voting in pan-Europe – with control variables 
Added to model 1 are the variable Age – how old the respondents are, Female – the sex of the 
respondents, Unemployed – is the respondent unemployed and Education – the level of 
education.  
 
Table 7 Model 2: The effect on PRR-voting in Pan-Europe – with control variables 
Variable Coef. Std.err Z P>|z|   Odds ratio Std. Coeff. 
France -.491 .275 -1.79 .074    .612 -.076 
Germany -.928 .290 -3.20 .001* .395 -.161 
Austria 1.638 .227 7.22 .000* 5.142 .244 
Belgium .709 .236 3.01 .003* 2.033 .114 
Denmark .078 .272 .29 .774 1.081 .010 
Slovakia .641 .238 2.69 .007* 1.898 .097 
Hungary -.781 .337 -2.32 .020* .458 -.096 
Romania .086 .275 .31 .754 .299 .011 
Russia .566 .231 2.45 .014* .407 .105 
Age -.017 .003 -6.38 .000* .983 -.144 
Female -.507 .083 -6.09 .000* .602 -.126 
Education -.158 .023 -6.93 .000* .854 -.167 
Unemployed .148 .144 1.03 .303 1.160 .020 
Constant -1.482 .279 -5.31 .000*   
LR chi2(13 471.71  HL chi2(8) 10.55   
Prob > chi2 0.000  Prob > chi2 .2286   
McFadden’s Adj. R² .088  -2LL 4576.730   
N = 11046       
*   Significant at the .05-level 
 
The number of observations in this model has decreased somewhat, N being 165 observations 
less than for Model 1. The overall power of the model has not increased very much with the 
addition of the control variables, but it is significantly better23. The -2LL has decreased from -
4848.5518 to -4576.730 and the McFaddens Adj. R² has increased to .088. The Hosmer-
Lemeshow test is still insignificant; however the inclusion of the control variables has moved 
the value closer to a significant result. As remembered from section 3.2.3, standardized 
coefficients are only meaningful for the metric variables and will be discussed for those 
exclusively. To compare the effect of the dummy variables, the discrete effects will be 
discussed for the complete models later on. At this stage, identifying significance for the 
control variables is the primary goal. 
 
The Age variable has a negative coefficient, meaning that an increase of age would decrease 
the probability of being a PRR-voter. The effect is clearly significant even at the .05-level. 
The odds-ratio is .983. From the run-through of logistic regression we know that an odds-ratio 
                                                 
23
 See appendix for test 
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below 1.0 indicates a negative relationship between the independent and the dependent 
variable. Since we are dealing with odds-ratios the effect is the same independent of where we 
are on the x-axis. For each year a respondent age the odds for being a PRR-voter decrease 
with 1.724 percentage points. The (fully) standardized coefficient is -.144. For each standard 
deviation increase on the x-axis there is a decrease of -.144 standard deviations on the y-axis. 
The direction of the coefficient is in line with the assumption that the typical PRR-voter is 
relatively young (Givens 2005).  
 
The Female-variable shares the same basic characteristics as the Age-variable. It has a 
negative coefficient at -.507 and is significant at the .05-level. This is a dummy variable and a 
negative coefficient indicates that a male respondent (0) is more likely to be a PRR-voter than 
a female respondent (1). The odds-ratio is .602. A female respondent has 39.8 percentage 
points lower odds than a man. PRR-parties have always been  male-dominated  (Givens 2004) 
and the results confirms the theoretical assumption. 
 
Education has a negative coefficient at -.158, revealing that the higher education the less 
likely it is for a respondent to vote for a PRR-party. Like the other two control variables 
Education is also significant at the .05-level. The odds-ratio is .854. This means that for each 
level of education the respondent advance, the odds for being a PRR-voter decrease with 
14,625 percentage points. In other words, the higher education the less likely it is that the 
respondent votes for a PRR-party. The standardized coefficient is -.167. Another similarity 
with the other control variables is that also Education is in line with the theoretical 
expectations (Westin 2003).  
 
The Unemployed-variable has a positive coefficient of .148, in line with the theoretical 
expectation that respondents who are unemployed are more likely to vote for PRR-parties. 
However, the variable is not significant and both the odds ratio and standardized coefficient 
shows that it has a minimum of impact on the dependent variable. This reflects the theoretical 
diversity on the subject, where Jackman and Volpert (1996) is one of few studies where a 
significant effect has been detected, albeit this was at the macro level. The results from model 
2 state that unemployment is not a significant variable at the micro level.  
                                                 
24
 Percentage change in odds = (exponentiated coefficient – 1.0) x 100 
(983-1) x 100 = 1,7 per cent change in odds 
25
 (.854-1) x 100 = -14.6 
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Summarized, the second model has revealed that three control variables have a significant 
effect and all have proven to influence the probability for being a PRR-voter in the assumed 
direction. The Unemployed- variable was insignificant and will not be included in the 
following pan-European models. The third model will include the independent  variables of 
interest, a first indication of which issues that mobilize PRR-voters.  
 
4.4 Model 3: The effect on PRR-voting in Pan-Europe – full model 
Model 3 will take us a step closer to answering the research question. After having established 
the significant difference between countries and the relevance of the control variables I will 
now add the independent variables of interest to see which issues mobilize PRR-voters.  
 
Table 8 Model 3: The effect on party choice in Pan-Europe – full model 
 
Variable Coef. Z P>|z|   Odds ratio Std. 
Coeff. 
France -.553 -1.75 .080 .575 -.085     
Germany -.931 -2.81 .005* .394 -.156     
Austria 1.792 6.95 .000* 6.004 .273     
Belgium .682 2.57 .010* 1.979 .110     
Denmark .061 0.19 .847 1.063 .007     
Slovakia .708 2.54  .011* 2.030 .091     
Hungary -1.069 -2.89 .004* .343 -.134     
Romania -.0322 -0.10 .921 .968 -.004     
Russia .616 2.29 .022* 1.852 .093     
Age -.018 -5.47 .000*  .983 -.137    
Female -.476 -4.71 .000* .621 -.112     
Education -.097 -3.49 .000* .907 -.097     
Lack of confidence – EU .488 4.27 .000* 1.629 .114     
Lack of confidence  - Parliament .534 4.43 .000* 1.705 .121     
Environment – no financial support .048 1.53 .127 1.049 .039     
Strong leader .203 1.82 .068 1.225 .043     
Cultural resistance – immigration .303 2.50 .012* 1.354 .068     
Employment resistance - immigration .534 4.81 .000* 1.705 .124     
Extremist attitudes .713 5.28 .000* 2.040 .113     
Economic preferences .018 2.02 .043* 1.018 .050    
Constant -2.594 -6.79 .000*   
LR chi2(20) 537.44 HL chi2(8) 3.89   
Prob > chi2 .000 Prob > chi2 .8670   
McFaddens Adj. R² .136 -2LL 3038.047   
N = 760426      
*   Significant at the .05-level (two-tailed) 
 
                                                 
26
 The drop in observations is a possible break on the assumption of “missing at random” and is problematic 
when comparing between models, however the need for maximum number of observations in order to answer the 
research question has been deemed more important. A visual inspection does not reveal any systematic lack of 
response 
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When we look at the general level of the model we see that the -2LL has decreased from 
4666.6924 to 3038.047. The model is significantly better27 . The McFadden Adj. R² has 
increased from .088 to .136. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test is also insignificant indicating that 
the model fits the logistic curve.  
 
Table 9 Checking for country differences pan-European 
Wald test  
Chi2 (9) 282.17 
Prob > chi2 .000 
 
It is necessary to perform a second Wald test to confirm that there are country differences 
even after the independent variables have been added to the analysis. Theoretically the 
differences between countries detected in model 1 could have been explained by the inclusion 
of the independent variables. However, the Wald-test shows that there is still a significant 
difference between the countries that is not accounted for by the independent variables, which 
justifies the inclusion in the third model. 
 
Starting with the three control variables, they are all still significant at the .05-level, and have 
the same direction, as shown by the original coefficient.  
 
Lack of Confidence - EU has a positive coefficient sign and is significant at the .05-level. The 
odds-ratio is 1.629. An increase of one, moving from having confidence to having no 
confidence in the EU, increases the odds with 62.9 percentage points. From this we learn that 
a lack of confidence in the European Union is a significant political issue for mobilizing PRR-
voters.  
 
Lack of Confidence - Parliament share the same characteristics as previous variable. The 
coefficient is positive, showing the direction of the variable. Since the variable is coded 0 – 
confidence and 1 – no confidence, it is clear that a lack of confidence towards national 
parliaments increases the chance of being a PRR-voter. The variable is significant at the .05-
level and the odds-ratio is 1.705. A respondent that lacks confidence in the EU has 70.5 
percentage points higher odds for being a PRR-voter than a respondent with confidence.  
 
                                                 
27
 See appendix for test results 
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Moving on to Environment – no financial support, the coefficient is positive, meaning that the 
more inclined a respondent is to be negative against state involvement to protect the 
environment, the more likely the same respondent is a PRR-voter. However, the variable is 
not significant, showing that PRR-parties does not mobilize voters on post-materialist values 
and should thus not be counted as part of a “silent counter-revolution”.  
 
Strong leader has a positive coefficient, the expected direction based on the theoretical 
assumptions. The variable is not significant at the .05-level, but is not far off with a 
significance value of .068. The possibility of a one-tailed test was considered, which would 
have made the variable significant, but I did not consider the theoretical fundament to be 
strong enough.  
 
If we look at the variables connected to fear of “the others”, all three variables are significant. 
Cultural resistance - Immigration has a positive coefficient, telling us that if respondents feel 
that immigrants should give up cultural customs they are more likely to vote for a PRR-party. 
The variable is significant at the .05. The odds-ratio is 1.354, those who dislike immigration 
on the basis of cultural resistance has odds that are 35.4 percentage points higher than those 
who do not.  
  
Employment resistance – Immigration also has a positive coefficient, meaning that if a 
respondent is restrictive in his views on immigration related to the work market, he/she is 
more likely to be a PRR-voter. The variable is significant at the .05-level and has an odds-
ratio of 1.705. Thus, a respondent with a restrictive view has odds that are 70.5 percentage 
points higher than one who holds the liberal view on immigrants coming to work in their 
country.  
 
Extremist attitudes is also significant at the .05-level. The coefficient is positive, telling us 
that extremist views are positive for the probability of being a PRR-voter. The odds-ratio is 
the highest of all the explanatory variables at 2.040. Those with extremist views has  odds that 
are 104 percentage points higher than someone without extremist views.  
 
The final variable is the Economic preferences-variable. It is significant at the .05-level and 
has a positive effect. Remembering how the variable is coded, a positive coefficient means 
that right-wing economics is positive for the PRR. The odds-ratio is 1.018, meaning that for 
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each increase on the x-axis the odds increase with 1.8 percentage points. The standardized 
coefficient has a value of .050, the weakest effect of the significant metric variables.   
 
Summing up Model 3, all the variables except for, Strong leader and Environment – no 
financial support, came out significant at the .05-level. Strong leader would be significant at 
the .10-level, but due to the large number of respondents the cut-off point has been set at a 
restrictive level. Environment – no financial support is clearly insignificant and shows that the 
“silent counter-revolution” is not a political issue that mobilizes PRR-voters.  
 
So far the results have been reported in logit values and odds ratios. However, by utilizing the 
mfx-command in Stata is possible to calculate the marginal and discrete effects for each of the 
significant variables. This way we can identify how much effect the variables have on the 
probability for voting for a PRR-party. The marginal and discrete effects show the increase on 
the dependent variable when the independent variable increases per unit change, when all 
other variables are held at their mean. The marginal effects are for metric variables, whereas 
discrete effects report the change when dummy variables move from 0 to 1. This process has 
been performed for all the significant variables in the pan-European model.  
 
Since the dummy variables have the same interval between 0 and 1, the discrete effects can be 
used to compare the strength of the variables. This is not applicable for the metric variables, 
but here the standardized coefficients can be used to compare the effect between the metric 
variables exclusively.  
 
Table 10 Marginal and discrete effects from the pan-European model 
Variable Effect Percentage change in 
probability 
Z 
Age -.0007 -0.07 % -5.48 
Female -.0182 -1.82 % -4.68 
Education -.0037 -0.37 % -3.50 
Lack of confidence – EU .0182* 1.82 % 4.35 
Lack of confidence – Parliament .0193* 1.93 % 4.65 
Cultural resistance – Immigration .0111* 1.11 % 2.61 
Employment resistance - Immigration  .0197* 1.97 % 4.92 
Extremist attitudes .0351* 3.51 % 4.18 
Economic preferences .0007 0.07 % 2.02 
* Discrete effects for dummy variables 
 
The results reflect the odds ratios with Extremist attitudes being the strongest dummy variable. 
If a respondent moves from not having extremist attitudes to having those attitudes, the 
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probability for being a PRR-voter increases with 3.51 per cent, given that all other variables 
are held at their mean value. The second and third strongest of the dummies are Employment 
resistance – Immigration, with a percentage change of 1.97 per cent and Lack of confidence – 
Parliament, with a percentage change of 1.93 per cent. If a respondent moves from having 
confidence, to lacking confidence in the EU the probability for being a PRR-voter increases 
with 1.82 per cent. The same impact does the Female-variable have. The probability for being 
a PRR-voter is 1.82 per cent higher for a man than for a woman. The weakest of the dummy 
variables is Cultural resistance – Immigration, holding such attitudes only increase the 
probability with 1.11 per cent.  
 
We also see that the metric variables give small increases in probability. For each year a 
respondent age, the probability increases with -0.07 per cent. The same effect, but in the 
opposite direction, is present for Economic preferences. However, the standard coefficient is 
higher for the Age-variable, -.137 to .050, indicating that age has a stronger effect than 
economic preferences. Education decreases the probability with -0.37 per cent for each level 
of education. The standardized coefficient is -.097, positioning it between Age and Economic 
preferences in terms of strength. If all the significant variables of interest, and the control 
variables at an optimal level, are present, the total probability reaches 33.47 per cent.  
 
Figure 2 The effect of Extremist attitudes – controlled for age I 
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The figure below illustrates the effect of Extremist attitudes, the strongest dummy variable, 
when controlled against Age. Every variable not present in the figure is held at the mean value. 
We see that the likelihood for PRR-voting is at its highest when the respondent is young, and 
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also that there is a big gap in probability between those with extremist attitudes and those 
without extremist attitudes.  
 
4.5 Model 4: The effect on PRR-voting in Western Europe 
 
The model for Western Europe includes all variables, also those who were deemed to be 
insignificant in the pan-European model. The variables may still be significant when only WE 
is analysed and to be able to compare properly with the results of the pan-European model 
they must be included. In addition to the large model, a Wald-test to check for country 
differences is included, as well as checking the probabilities through the spost-command in 
Stata. Denmark is used as the reference category for the country dummies.  
 
Table 11 Model 4:  The effect on party choice in Western Europe 
 
Variable Coef. Z P>|z|    Odds ratio Std. 
Coeff. 
France -.658 -2.18 .029* .518 -.117 
Germany -1.100 -3.40 .001* .333 -.208 
Austria 1.736 7.32 .000* 5.673 .304 
Belgium .566 2.17 .030* 1.762 .103 
Age -.018 -4.32 .000* .982 -.133 
Female -.480 -3.67 .000* .619 -.105 
Education -.105 -2.91 .004* .900 -.101 
Unemployment .063 .24 .812 1.065 .007 
Lack of Confidence - EU .520 3.49 .000* 1.681 .113 
Lack of Confidence - Parliament  .702 4.65 .000* 2.018 .152 
Strong Leader .194 1.33 .184 1.214 .037 
Cultural resistance – Immigration .704 3.54 .000* 2.021 .132 
Employment resistance - Immigration .712 4.77 .000* 2.038 .153 
Extremist attitudes 1.041 5.59 .000* 2.833 .113 
Economic preferences .016 1.38 .166 1.016 .041 
Environment – no financial support .066 1.65 .099 1.068 .051 
Constant -4.181 -8.65 .000*   
LR chi2(16) 491.79 HL chi2(8) 10.73   
Prob > chi2 .000 Prob > chi2 .2174   
McFaddens Adj. R² .201 -2LL 1789.94   
N = 4423      
* Significant at the.05-level (two-tailed) 
The -2LL is 1789.94, down from 3038.047 in the pan-European model. The McFaddens Adj. 
R² is .201. This is an increase of 6.9 points from model 3. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test is 
insignificant, indicating a good model fit.  
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Table 12 Checking for country differences – Western Europe 
Wald test  
Chi2 (4) 217.05 
Prob > chi2 .000 
 
The Wald-test shows that there are still differences between countries, even when we only 
look at countries from Western Europe. The country dummies must therefore remain in the 
model. 
 
Age, Female and Education are all significant at the .05-level and have a negative coefficient, 
indicating that a young male with little education are the characteristics of a PRR-voter. Age 
has an odds ratio of .982, for each year a respondent ages, the odds for being a PRR-voter is 
reduced with 1.8 percentage points. The standardized coefficient is -.136. Female has an odds 
ratio of .619, a female has 39.1 percentage points lower odds for being a PRR-voter than a 
male. Education has an odds ratio of .899, for each increase in education level, the odds for 
being a PRR-voter decrease with 10.1 percentage points. The standardized coefficient is -.101. 
Unemployment was highly insignificant.  
 
Lack of Confidence – EU is significant with a positive coefficient, and has an odds ratio of 
1.681. If a respondent lacks confidence in the European Union, the odds for being a PRR-
voter are 68.1 percentage points higher than for someone with confidence in the European 
Union. Lack of Confidence – Parliament shares the same traits as the previous variable. The 
odds ratio is 2.018. If a respondent lacks confidence in the parliament, the odds for being a 
PRR-voter increase with 101.8 percentage points.  
 
Strong Leader is one out of three variables that is not significant in Western Europe, this is in 
line with the theoretical expectations. As expected, both variables connected to immigration 
are highly significant. Cultural resistance – Immigration has a positive coefficient and the 
odds ratio is 2.021. If a respondent wants immigrants to assimilate into the existing national 
culture, the odds for being a PRR-voter are 102.1 percentage points higher than if the 
respondent would allow an immigrant to retain his own culture. Employment resistance – 
Immigration also has a positive coefficient, revealing that the effect points in the same 
direction as the previous variable. The odds ratio is 2.038, giving odds that are 103.8 
percentage points higher if the respondent is negative to immigration on the basis of his own 
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job security. Since both variables are significant, it proves that immigration mobilize PRR-
voters in WE.  
 
Extremist attitudes is also significant with a positive coefficient. The odds ratio is 2.833, the 
highest in the analysis. If a respondent has extremist attitudes the odds increase with 183,3 
percentage points. That is the highest increase in odds of the independent variables. The 
significance of the variable in Western Europe is against the theoretical expectations. This 
will be discussed more in-length in the next chapter.  
 
The two last variables, Economic preferences and Environment – no financial support, do not 
yield significant results. Both have a positive coefficient, the theoretically assumed direction, 
but fail to have a significant impact on the dependent variable. That Economic preferences is 
insignificant, supports the claim made by Mudde, saying that economic policies are 
subordinate to other areas for PRR-parties (Mudde 2007:119). Environment – no financial 
support is significant at the .10-level, but the cut-off level for the analysis is at .05-level.  
 
Three out of four control variables, and five out of eight independent variables of interest, are 
significant. When comparing the standardized coefficients, Employment resistance – 
Immigration is the strongest, followed by Lack of Confidence – Parliament and Extremist 
attitudes.  
 
Probabilities of the significant independent variables of interest, give even more information 
on the impact on the dependent variables. The probabilities are found through the mfx-
command in Stata. The method has already been described in subsection 4.6.  
 
Table 13 Marginal and discrete effects from the Western European model 
 
Variable Effect Percentage change in 
probability 
Z 
Age -.0006 -0.06 % -4.27 
Female -.0160* -1.6   % -3.60 
Education -.0035 -0.35 % -2.89 
Lack of confidence – EU .0168* 1.68 % 3.53 
Lack of confidence – Parliament .0227* 2.27 % 4.65 
Cultural resistance - Immigration .0200* 2.00 % 4.11 
Employment resistance – Immigration .0226* 2.26 % 4.79 
Extremist attitudes .0538* 5.38 % 3.78 
* Discrete effects for dummy variables 
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When looking at the marginal and discrete effects, Extremist attitudes is still the strongest 
variable. If a respondent obtains extremist attitudes, with all other variables held at the mean 
value, the probability increases for being a PRR-voter increases with 5.38 per cent. The 
second strongest dummy variable is Lack of confidence – Parliament, a change from 
confidence to no confidence, increases the probability with 2.27 per cent. It is closely 
followed by Employment resistance – Immigration, which increases the probability with 2.26 
per cent. The weakest effect is obtained for Female. A male is 1.6 per cent more likely to vote 
for a PRR-party than a woman.  
 
For each year a respondent age, the probability for being a PRR-voter decreases with 0.06 per 
cent. For each higher education level, the probability decreases with 0.35 per cent. As with the 
dummy variables, the percentages apply when all other variables are held constant at their 
mean value. When comparing the metric variables, Age has the strongest effect. Its 
standardized coefficient is -.133, compared to Education and its standardized coefficient of -
.101. All percentages apply only when all other variables are held at their mean value. 
 
When all the significant independent variables of interest, and the significant control variables, 
are present at an optimal level, the probability for being a PRR-voter is 40.52 per cent. 
 
The figure below shows the effect of the strongest variables, again Extremist attitudes, when 
controlled against Age. All variables not mentioned in the figure are held at their mean value.   
 
Figure 3 The effect of Extremist attitudes – controlled for age II 
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4.6 Model 5: The effect on PRR-voting in Central and Eastern Europe 
As with the model for WE, the model for Central and Eastern European include all variables, 
also those who were deemed to be insignificant in the pan-European model. The variables 
may still be significant when only CEE is analysed and to be able to compare properly with 
the results of the pan-European model they must be included. In addition to the large model, a 
wald-test to check for country differences is included. Croatia is used as the reference 
category for the country dummies.  
 
Table 14 Model 5: The effect on PRR-voting in Central and Eastern Europe 
Variable Coef. Z P>|z|   Odds ratio Std. 
Coeff. 
Slovakia .843 2.84 .004* 2.324 .176 
Hungary -.553 -1.42 .155 .575 -.110 
Romania .053 .15 .879 1.054 .010 
Russia .656 2.29 .022* 1.927 .154 
Age -.018 -3.11 .002* .982 -.144 
Female -.490 -2.90 .004* .612 -.127 
Education -.039 -.83 .408 .961 -.040 
Unemployment .239 .99 .320 1.270 .037 
Lack of Confidence - EU .403 2.16 .031* 1.497 .103 
Lack of Confidence - Parliament  .160 .77 .441 1.173 .037 
Strong Leader .167 .92 .355 1.182 .041 
Cultural resistance – Immigration .055 .32 .746 1.057 .014 
Employment resistance - Immigration .095 .54 .592 1.099 .024 
Extremist attitudes .454 2.24 .025* 1.574 .097 
Economic preferences .014 .97 .334 1.014 .043 
Environment – no financial support .-010 -.19 .850 .990 -.008 
Constant -2.875 -4.75 .000* .056  
LR chi2(26) 64.29 HL chi2(8) 11.80   
Prob > chi2 .000 Prob > chi2 .161   
McFaddens Adj. R .002 -2LL -605.44   
N = 2976      
* Significant at the .05-level (two-tailed) 
Even though very few of the independent variables of interest are significant, the -2LL is 
down to 1210.88 from 3038.047 in the pan-European model. Considering the drop in -2LL, 
the McFaddens Adj. R² is surprisingly low, at just .002.  
 
Table 15 Checking for country differences – Central and Eastern Europe 
Wald test  
Chi2 (4) 25.30 
Prob > chi2 .000 
 
The Wald-test is significant also for the country dummies in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
results therefore justify the inclusion of the country dummies in the analysis to explain 
contextual differences, not accounted for by the independent variables.  
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Age and Female are significant at the .05-level with a negative coefficient, as expected. Age 
has an odds ratio of .982, for each year a respondent age, the odds of being a PRR-voter 
increase with 1.8 percentage points. The standardized coefficient is -.144. Female has an odds 
ratio of .612. A female respondent has 38.8 percentage points lower odds than a male 
respondent for being a PRR-voter. Unemployment and Education fails to yield a significant 
result.  
 
Lack of Confidence – EU is one of two independent variables of interest that is significant, 
and as expected it has a positive coefficient. The odds ratio is 1.497, giving some who lacks 
confidence odds that are 49.7 percentage points higher than someone with confidence in the 
EU. Lack of Confidence – Parliament has a positive coefficient, the theoretically expected 
direction, but the variable is not significant.  
 
The same goes for Strong Leader, Cultural resistance – Immigration and Employment 
resistance – Immigration. The coefficients show that the direction of the variables is as 
expected, but the results are not significant, showing that variables do not have a significant 
impact on the dependent variable. As expected the two variables connected to immigration 
was insignificant, but it is more surprising that Strong Leader shared the same fate. It can be 
taken as evidence for a consolidating democratic perception in CEE.  
 
Extremist attitudes provides the second significant result. That the variable is significant was 
expected, due to the tendencies discussed in chapter two. The coefficient is positive and the 
odds ratio is 1.574, the highest in the CEE-model. A respondent with extremist attitudes has 
odds for being a PRR-voter that are 57.4 percentage points higher than some without 
extremist attitudes.  
 
The two remaining variables in the model, Economic preferences and Environment – no 
financial support are not significant. The second variable also has a negative coefficient, 
saying that people who are positive to financial support of the environment are more likely to 
vote for PRR-parties.  
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Summarized from the model, two control variables, Age and Female, are significant. Of the 
independent variables of interest, only two came out significant, Lack of Confidence – EU and 
Extremist attitudes.  
 
Table 16 Marginal and discrete effects from the Central and Eastern European 
model 
Variable Effect Percentage change in probability Z 
Age -.0008 -0.08 % -3.17 
Female -.0216* -2.16 % -2.92 
Lack of confidence – EU .0174* 1.74  % 2.21 
Extremist attitudes  .0225* 2.25  % 2.00 
* Discrete effects for dummy variables 
 
As was revealed in the regression model for Central and Eastern Europe, the number of 
significant variables is reduced from the previous models. Extremist attitudes is yet again the 
strongest dummy variable. Someone with extremist attitudes has 2.25 per cent higher 
probability of being a PRR-voter than someone without extremist attitudes. More surprising is 
it to see that Age has a higher discrete effect than Lack of confidence – EU. A male respondent 
is 2.16 per cent more likely to be a PRR-voter than a woman. If a respondent lacks confidence 
in the EU, he or she is 1.74 per cent more likely to be a PRR-voter. Age is the only metric 
variable that was significant. For each year a respondent ages, the probability for being a 
PRR-voter decreases with 0.08 per cent. All percentage figures apply only when all other 
variables are held at their mean value. When all the significant independent variables are 
present, as well as all the significant control variables with optimal values, the overall 
probability for the model in CEE is 13.72 per cent.  
 
The figure confirms the importance of Extremist attitudes, but the gap between those who 
have extremist attitudes and those without extremist attitudes is smaller than in the pan-
European and Western European models. Again, the probability decreases notably with age.  
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Figure 4 The effect Extremist attitudes - controlled for age III 
 
 
 
4.7 Model 6: The effect on PRR-voting in pan-Europe – Including interaction terms 
Even though the models from Western and Central and Eastern Europe reported differences in 
the significant variables, the number of respondents in the two models is different. The WE-
model has 1447 respondents more than the CEE-model. In order to make sure that the 
differences are statistically significant and not a result of the different samples, I have 
conducted a new pan-European model with interaction terms to be able to measure differences 
between the two regions. The model will have multicollinearity between the original variables 
and the interaction terms, making meaningful interpretation of the coefficients, like in 
previous models, impossible. Thus, the individual coefficients, but whether or not the 
independent variables and their respective interaction term are collectively significant. This is 
conducted through a Wald-test and the direction is interpreted by looking at the coefficient 
sign of the interaction term. Since the Western Europe is coded 1 in the region dummy, a 
positive coefficient means that the effect of the variable in question is more positive in WE 
and likewise for CEE with a negative coefficient. The fact that the coefficients for WE and 
CEE are significantly different from each other, do not prevent them for being significantly 
different from zero in both regions.  
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Table 17 Model 6: The effect on PRR-voting in pan-Europe – Including interaction 
terms  
Variable Coef. Z P>|z|   Odds ratio Stand. 
Coeff. 
France -2.342 -3.87 .000* .096 -.357 
Germany -2.800 -4.51 .000* .061 -.463 
Austria .060 .10 .918 1.061 .009 
Belgium -1.153 -2.02 .043* .315 -.182 
Denmark -1.686 -2.79 .005* .185 -.203 
Slovakia .817 2.77 .006* 2.265 .105 
Hungary -.605 -1.57 .117 .546 -.073 
Romania .028 .08 .936 1.028 .003 
Russia .655 2.28 .022* 1.925 .098 
Age -.018 -5.29 .000* .982 -.136 
Female -.488 -4.72 .000* .614 -.113 
Education -.082 -2.85 .004* .922 -.080 
Unemployment .155 .87 .382 1.17 .019 
Lack of confidence – EU .397 2.13 .033* 1.487 .091 
Lack of confidence – Parliament .160 .77 .440 1.173 .036 
Environment – no financial support -.015 -.28 .782 .985 -.012 
Strong Leader .156 .87 .386 1.168 .033 
Cultural resistance – Immigration .048 .29 .775 1.050 .011 
Employment resistance – Immigration .086 .49 .627 1.090 .020 
Extremist attitudes .441 2.18 .029* 1.554 .068 
Economic preferences .015 1.07 .285 1.015 .042 
Lack of confidence – EU*WE .124 .52 .601 1.132 .027 
Lack of confidence – Parliament*WE .542 2.12 .034* 1.719 .119 
Environment – no financial support*WE .083 1.24 .214 1.087 .098 
Strong Leader*WE .050 .22 .830 1.051 .008 
Cultural resistance – Immigration*WE .667 2.55 .011* 1.948 .154 
Employment resistance – Immigration*WE .635 2.76 .006* 1.888 .141 
Extremist attitudes*WE .609 2.22 .026* 1.838 .055 
Economic preferences*WE .001 .05 .963 1.001 .004 
Constant -.2.624 -5.14 .000*   
LR chi2(29) 562.46 HL chi2(8) 6.08   
Prob > chi2 .000 Prob > chi2 .6386   
MacFaddens Adj. R² .1578 -2LL 3002.2672   
N = 7399      
 
Table 18 Significant differences between WE and CEE 
Wald-tests   
Variable Chi2 (2) Prob > chi2 
Lack of confidence - EU 16.78 .000 
Lack of confidence – Parliament 22.30 .000 
Environment – no financial support 3.06 .217 
Strong Leader 2.73 .255 
Cultural resistance – Immigration 13.06 .002 
Employment resistance – Immigration 23.66 .000 
Extremist attitudes 36.71 .000 
Economic preferences 3.00 .224 
 
The table shows the Wald-tests conducted on the independent variables of interest. As we can 
see, there are significant differences between five of the independent variables of interest. 
Beginning with the variables without a significant difference, Strong Leader and Environment 
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– no financial support were not significant in neither WE nor CEE. The Wald-tests do not 
show any difference, as one would expect. Economic preferences was significant in the pan-
European model, but not in any of the regional models. The Wald-test does not show any 
significant difference for this variable either. For the three variables that were significant in 
WE, but not in CEE, Lack of confidence – Parliament, Cultural resistance – Immigration and 
Employment resistance – Immigration, all have significant differences between the regions. 
When looking at table 17, the coefficients for the respective interaction terms all have a 
positive coefficient, meaning that the effect is more positive in WE than in CEE.  
 
The two variables that were significant in both regional models, Lack of confidence – EU and 
Extremist attitudes, also report a significant difference between WE and CEE. Both 
interaction terms have positive coefficients, showing that the effect is more positive in WE  
than in CEE.  
 
Overall, the use of interaction terms shows that all coefficients, except for three insignificant 
variables, have significant differences between WE and CEE. This shows that the differences 
identified in models 4 and 5 are significant and not the result of the selection of respondents.  
 
4.8 Checking the assumptions of logistic regression 
There are three main assumptions of logistic regression. First the models must fit the non-
linear s-shaped curve, second the error terms must be uncorrelated and third the error term 
and the independent variables must be uncorrelated (Skog 2004:380-385).  
 
The first assumption is checked through the Hosmer-Lemeshow test which measure the 
overall fit of the model. If the H-L test is significant there are significant differences between 
actual and predicted values, indicating that the model is not S-shaped (Hair et al. 2005:372; 
Skog 2004:383-385). Thus insignificant values are desirable. The H-L value and significance 
level is reported in all four models and are insignificant for all four models. The model 
therefore satisfies this assumption of logistic regression.  
 
The second assumption was that the error terms have to be uncorrelated with each other. This 
is a problem more vital in times series or panel data. In cross-sectional studies based on 
random selection such as my data set, this is not a problem. However, there may be 
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correlation within countries, and even parties. This has not been checked for in this thesis and 
is a subject in subchapter 5.3.3. 
 
The final assumption is that the error term is uncorrelated with the independent variables. This 
means that there cannot be underlying variables that both affects the dependent variable and is 
correlated with the error term. This is substantially perhaps the most important, but still the 
most difficult assumption to test for (Skog 2004). The Hausman-test demands a good set of 
instrumental variables, and has not been performed. The most accessible way of testing it is 
through multiple logistic regression analysis as used in this thesis.  
 
VIF-values indicate no multicollinearity between the independent variables. Rabe-Hesketh 
and Everitt (2007) refers to a critical value of 10 to indicate that there is a problem with 
collinearity. None of my variables have a VIF-value close to this, all values are reported in the 
appendix. I have also checked for influential observations using Dfbeta values28.  
 
4.9 Summary of the analyses 
The chapter started off with a descriptive analysis of all variables. Furthermore the descriptive 
data did not reveal very surprising results. The first set of models contained observations from 
all of Europe. The first model and subsequent Wald and LR-test showed that there was a 
significant difference between countries that needed to be controlled for in the later models.  
 
The second model including the control variables confirmed that a male gender, young age 
and low education are significant characteristics of the PRR-voter. When I added the 
independent variables of interest in the pan-European model, all of them were significant at 
the .05-level except for Environment – no financial support and Strong Leader. This showed 
that most of the traditional issues concerning the PRR-parties, except the “silent counter-
revolution” mobilize voters for PRR-parties. The discrete effects showed that Extremist 
attitudes was the strongest dummy variable, while the standardized coefficients showed that 
Age was the strongest metric variable.  
 
In Western Europe, as seen in the table below, five out the six variables from the pan-
European model were significant. Yet again, Extremist attitude proved to be the strongest 
                                                 
28
 The Dfbeta values were collected by using SPSS 
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dummy variable and Age was the strongest metric variable. The same personal characteristics 
were significant in the Western European model and there were significant differences 
between the countries included in the analysis.  
 
The analysis for Central and Eastern Europe contained only two significant independent 
variables of interest, Lack of Confidence – EU and Extremist attitudes, which the latter had 
the strongest effect of the dummy variables. In addition only Age and Female of the control 
variables were significant. However, as for the other models, the Wald-test revealed 
significant differences between countries.  
 
The differences from the pan-European model to the CEE-model show how a pan-European 
approach can cloud regional differences within Europe.  
 
By making use of interaction terms I also showed that the differences between the coefficients 
from WE and CEE were significant.  
 
Table 19 Significant issues – a summary 
Variable Pan-European WE CEE 
Lack of confidence – EU X X X 
Lack of confidence  - Parliament X X  
Strong leader 
   
Cultural resistance – Immigration X X  
Employment resistance – Immigration X X  
Extremist attitudes X X X 
Economic preferences X   
Environment – no financial support 
   
Age X X X 
Female X X X 
Education X X  
Unemployment 
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5 Discussion 
 
The final chapter will discuss the results and answer the hypotheses presented in chapter two., 
as well as answering the general research question. I will start by comparing the results from 
the three main models, pan-European, Western European and Eastern European, before 
moving on to connect the results with the hypotheses. Before concluding I will discuss how 
my results have implications for future research 
 
5.1 Comparing models 
I have tested three29 separate models with all the variables included. A pan-European model, 
with and without interaction terms, and two regional models for WE and CEE, respectively. 
When comparing the models reveal large regional differences, but also a few similarities in 
terms of voter characteristics and to political issues in common.  
 
All models had an insignificant Hosmer-Lemeshow test, indicating the all the models had a 
good model fit. Two other similarities concern the differences between countries and the 
characteristics of PRR-voters. Although, not part of the main research question, it has been 
important to control for these factors to give an accurate as possible analysis. In all analyses, 
there has been a significant difference between countries, justifying the inclusion of country 
dummies.  
 
Second, two personal characteristics of the PRR-voters proved to be the same across Europe, 
those of Age and Female. In the pan-European and the Western European model, the level of 
education was also significant, but it failed to yield a significant result in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Neither in WE nor in CEE was Unemployment significant, confirming that 
employment status is not a significant characteristic. While Golder (2003) proved that 
unemployment does not matter at an macro level, this is also true at the micro level. 
 
However, most similarities end here. Neither the MacFaddens Adj. R² nor the -2LL value 
contributes much to a comparison as the sample of observations has been different in all 
analysis. Instead, we must look at the number of significant findings and the overall 
probability of the models. The WE-model has five significant variables of interest, whereas 
                                                 
29
 Excluding Model 6: The effect on PRR-voting in pan-Europe – with interaction terms, as this model was used 
to test difference between regions and cannot be compared to the models 3, 4 and 5.  
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the CEE-model only has two. A comparison between the regional models and the pan-
European model also shows how an issue that looks to be significant for all of Europe, not 
necessarily is so, when investigated more closely. Model 6 also confirmed the results from the 
regional model, and added more strength by, through Wald-tests, showing that there were 
significant differences between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe.   
 
Including all the significant independent variables, including the control variables and holding 
all other variables at their mean level, the probability for being a PRR-voter in the pan-
European model is 33.47 per cent. When the two regions are compared with the pan-European 
analysis we see a clear difference. The probability in WE for being a PRR-voter, with the 
presence of the significant variables is 40.52 per cent. The probability in CEE, with similar 
settings, is only 13.72 percent. That is a difference of 26.8 per cent. The model is thus better 
suited to explain PRR-voting in Western Europe.  
 
Turning to the significance of the independent variables of interest, the pan-European analysis 
give the impression that a number of variables are significant in Europe. However, the 
regional analyses show that the picture is more complicated. When studying the independent 
variables of interest exclusively, the pan-European analysis has six significant variables, Lack 
of Confidence – EU, Lack of Confidence – Parliament, Cultural resistance – Immigration, 
Employment resistance – Immigration, Extremist attitudes and Economic preferences. 
Turning the attention to the WE-model, five variables are significant. The same as the ones 
mentioned above, with the exception of Economic preferences. The CEE-analysis only give 
two variables that are significant for mobilizing PRR-voters in the region, Lack of Confidence 
– EU and Extremist attitudes. 
 
In Europe as a whole, the analysis will identify four variables, Lack of Confidence – 
Parliament, Cultural resistance – Immigration, Employment resistance – Immigration and 
Economic preferences, which are not significant in CEE. The latter variable is the only 
variable that is significant in Europe as a whole, but not in one of the two regional analyses. 
The first three are significant in both Europe as a whole and WE, but not in CEE.  
 
Without getting into details about the strength of the individual variables, it seems clear that a 
pan-European analysis gives a biased perception of which issues that mobilize PRR-voters 
across Europe.  A quantitative analysis of PRR-parties, following the selection made by 
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Mudde, would wrongly assume that resistance against immigration mobilize voters in CEE-
countries. However, the regional analyses clearly show that resistance against immigration is 
significant only in WE, as expected from the theoretical assumptions. We see how the 
definitional dispute, referred to in chapter 2, is illustrated through the results found in this 
thesis. The pan-European analysis provides results that would make CEE parties suitable to be 
called anti-immigrant parties, whereas this is clearly not the case if PRR-parties were 
investigated separately for WE and CEE.  
 
That a model, based on the traditional political issues, that theoretically have been identified 
as important for PRR-parties, produces such diverging results, must be taken as evidence for 
the differences between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. However, the thesis 
also recognizes that similarities exist, first and foremost are two variables significant in both 
regions, Lack of Confidence – EU and Extremist attitudes, as well as two control variables. 
Still, a pan-European analysis would yield results that cannot be taken for granted in Europe 
as a whole.  
 
5.2 Answering the hypotheses 
In order to fully understand the results, they must be interpreted in light of the hypotheses 
presented in chapter two. The previous subchapter pointed at a few similarities and a number 
of differences. Through answering the hypotheses I can give a more detailed discussion of the 
results and be able to conclude with regards to the overall research question.  
 
H1a: PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilize voters who want stricter immigration 
regulations based on a cultural aspect 
 
I based this assumption on the fact that immigration has yet to become a very politicized topic 
in Central and Eastern Europe (Merkl 2003:17; Minkenberg 2002:446; Mudde 2007:71). At 
the same time, the issue of immigration has always been seen as an area of competence (Betz 
2002:206) for PRR-parties in Western Europe. A survey of the literature revealed a 
development of “cultural nativism, which increasingly concerns itself with the future of 
European identity and particularly if the Western value system” (Betz 2003:84). The cultural 
resistance against immigration must also be seen in the light of the political discourses in 
Europe. Where the political arena is much more extreme in CEE, pure biological racism has 
led to poor performances in polls in WE (Givens 2005:201-215). So, aside from ideological 
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considerations, cultural racism seems to be a more strategic choice also from an electoral 
perspective.  
 
Cultural resistance – Immigration was significant in the pan-European analysis. However, as 
mentioned in the previous subchapter, a substantial difference was discovered in the regional 
analyses. In Western Europe the variable was still significant with higher values than in the 
pan-European analysis. In Central and Eastern Europe the variable was insignificant, and it 
also had the lowest odds ratio of all the independent variables of interest.  
 
The statistical differences between Western and Central and Eastern Europe should be 
interpreted as a strengthening of both previous findings, and also of Mudde, who recognizes 
that immigration is not a heavily politicized issue in Central and Eastern Europe (Mudde 
2007:69). When looking at the descriptive statistics for this variable, it should be noted that 
the presence of cultural resistance against immigrants is 23 per cent higher in Western Europe 
than in Central and Eastern Europe. This proves two things, both that immigration is a more 
present theme in Western Europe, but also that PRR-parties have been able to the presence of 
an attitude into a salient political issue. As such, Betz’s claim that immigration is the “main 
area of competence” (Betz 2002:206) still seems to be the case in Western Europe.  
 
The results confirm the hypothesis. PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilize voters who want 
stricter immigration regulations based on a cultural aspect, whereas it does not have an effect 
in Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
H1b: PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilize voters who want stricter immigration 
regulations based on job insecurity 
 
This hypothesis stems from a perceived connection between immigration and an increased 
chance of higher unemployment. As noted by Hainsworth (2008:76) and Norris (2005:175) 
the number of immigrants may not be the crucial element, rather the perception that 
immigrants are harmful to you in any way, that mobilize voters to PRR-parties. Jean Marie Le 
Pen took advantage of this in his election rhetoric when he proclaimed that “two million 
immigrants are the cause of two million French people out of work” (Golder 2003:438). 
Earlier research has found that the combination of immigration and unemployment is 
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significant at the aggregate level, and my hypothesis is able to shed light on whether this is 
also true at the individual level (Golder 2003).  
 
Much like the previous variable, Employment resistance – Immigration was significant in the 
pan-European analysis; the similarities do not stop there. In Western Europe the variable is 
still significant, but the result is reversed in Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
Again we see how a political issue, that of immigration, divides PRR-parties in Europe. The 
inclusion of employment adds another element, which moves resistance against immigration 
away from purely being based on various forms of racism. A rather simple explanation can be 
made for why the variables turns out to be significant in Western Europe, whereas it does not 
have any effect in Central and Eastern Europe. For a respondent to fear that they might loose 
their job due to immigration, two elements are necessary. First of all, a certain number of 
immigration must be present. Even though Hainsworth (2008) and Norris (2005) argue that 
the shear number of immigrants may not crucial, a certain level of immigration must be 
present, to invoke a sense of “fear” in the population. Second, it is plausible to think that a 
booming economy creates more employment than a weaker economy. Thus, migrant workers 
will be attracted by the strongest economies, where it is more likely that they will find work. 
It should therefore come as no surprise that workers have moved from Central and Eastern 
Europe to the stronger economies in Western Europe, rather than the other way around.  
 
With most of the migration going from CEE to WE, the significance of Employment 
resistance – Immigration in WE is as expected. Since immigration is not heavily politicized in 
CEE, and considering the fact that they mostly have been countries of emigration instead of 
immigration, it is not very surprising that the issue is not significant in the region. The 
descriptive analysis reveals almost identical levels of resistance of immigrants based on job 
security between WE and CEE. The difference in significance level is another confirmation 
that Western PRR-parties have been able to politicize it too a much greater degree than in 
CEE. The hypothesis is therefore confirmed.  
 
This is the second variable on immigration that is significant in WE and not in CEE. From the 
discussion it can be concluded that immigration is not a significant political issue for PRR-
parties in Central and Eastern Europe, but to a large degree is so in Western Europe. 
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H1c: PRR-parties in Central and Eastern Europe mobilize voters who express extreme 
attitudes  
 
The background for this hypothesis is the observation that the image of the outgroup is 
different in Central and Eastern Europe (Mudde 2007). Instead of immigrants, attention is 
paid to indigenous groups, such as gypsies, Roma and the religious group of the Jews. It 
seems like the level of tolerance for racial discourse is much higher in CEE, and several 
mainstream parties collaborate with PRR-parties. In his study of racist extremism in CEE, 
Mudde finds that harassment of the Roma and the Jews is far more widespread in CEE, partly 
as a natural consequence of the larger numbers, but also because it is much less condemned 
then it would have been in WE (Mudde 2005a; Westin 2003). While anti-Semitic arguments 
would lead to condemnation in WE, it is more present in CEE. Other groups of perceived 
deviants, such as homosexuals, are also a political issue more so in CEE than in WE. Gay 
people are seen “as a threat to the survival of the nation” (Mudde 2007:68).  
 
The variable, Extremist attitudes, include feelings against Jews, gypsies, people of a different 
race and homosexuals. It was significant in the pan-European analysis, but much to my 
surprise it also proved to be significant in both Western Europe and Central and Eastern 
Europe.  
 
What is surprising with the result is not that it is significant in CEE, which was expected from 
the theoretical assumptions, but that it is, not only significant, but also has a stronger effect in 
WE. From chapter two it was identified that when PRR-parties in WE used explicit racist 
arguments, it tended to damage their position in the polls (Givens 2005). So why then, is 
Extremist attitudes, one of the strongest political issues for PRR-parties in Western Europe?  
 
A potential explanation for why the variable is stronger in CEE, is the position those parties 
have within mainstream politics. As elaborated on earlier in the thesis, the political 
environment in CEE is more radical than WE, allowing for a tougher political discourse. 
PRR-parties do not stand out as much, when compared to the political mainstream, as they do 
in WE. For a voter in CE, extremist attitudes might not be a political issue that is exclusive for 
PRR-parties. That can explain why its level of importance is lesser in CEE than in WE, still it 
is noted that the variable is significant and give the highest probability in CEE. 
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In WE the situation is somewhat different when it comes to the positioning of the PRR-parties 
in the party specter. The situation has traditionally been the complete opposite than in CEE, 
PRR-parties have had an easily identifiable position within national politics, often being 
denied mainstream status. The parties therefore do not have to compete with other parties that 
carry nationalistic tendencies. In most cases a western PRR-party would have monopoly on 
voters with preferences that are either extremist or borderline extremist. It must also be taken 
into consideration that in important elections, voters place their vote for the party which is 
closest to their preferences, and at the same time has a realistic chance of gaining a seat in the 
parliament (Reif and Schmitt 1980).  
 
Following the thought of second-order elections, it seems plausible that western PRR-parties 
attract voters from right-wing fringe parties with extremist attitudes. These parties are too 
controversial to have a realistic change of being elected, thus a number of their voters choose 
the party closest to their preferences, in many cases this will be the PRR-parties included in 
this thesis. This is an effect that is more difficult to achieve in CEE, because more parties can 
front extremist attitudes with credibility, spreading these voters over several parties.  
In short, the higher effect of Extremist attitudes in WE can be explained by the status PRR-
parties have in WE party systems. They are likely to attract voters through the second-order 
mechanism, preferably from right-wing fringe parties, giving their total electorate a more 
radical set of opinions than first presumed. In CEE, this effect is not present, due to the 
radicalized political mainstream presenting several alternatives for voters with an extreme 
attitude. 
 
Again, if attention is paid to the descriptive analysis, extremist attitudes is present for 39 per 
cent of the CEE sample, while the figure is 15 per cent in the WE-sample. With this in mind, 
two things can be noted. First, that, PRR-parties in Western Europe have been better at 
mobilizing voters based on these attitudes than in CEE. While this also was the case with the 
two previous variables, it is more surprising that Extremist attitudes mirrors the immigration-
variables. Second, since the number of people in the electorates that hold these issues is much 
lower in WE, the potential for bringing larger electoral returns is bigger in CEE. Thus, PRR-
parties from CEE have an unreleased potential on this issue, as it is a significant issue in the 
region.    
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Nevertheless, Extremist attitudes is significant in both Western Europe and Central and 
Eastern Europe. This means that the hypothesis must be rejected. PRR-parties in both regions 
mobilize voters with extreme attitudes. This seems to be a uniting characteristic across Europe 
as a whole.   
 
H2: PRR-parties in Central and Eastern Europe mobilize voters who are disillusioned with 
political elites to a larger degree than in Western Europe 
 
Moving on to political disillusionment I proposed a hypothesis which claims that PRR-parties 
in CEE mobilize voters who are disillusioned with political elites to a larger degree than in 
WE. It is a fact that political trust and satisfaction with politicians is on the decline in Western 
Europe, and recent data sources also show this is true for Central and Eastern Europe 
(Eurobarometer 2007; Pharr and Putnam 2000). As I wrote in the theory chapter, I found it 
difficult to direct the hypothesis in a geographical direction. Historically, the protest and 
populist elements have been emphasized in Western Europe, but studies have shown that the 
resentment is actually bigger in Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
Lack of Confidence – Parliament was significant in the pan-European analysis. The regional 
models revealed a difference in significance, with a significant result in Western Europe and 
an insignificant result in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet again, a variable that seems to be 
significant for the whole of Europe has a significant difference between Western Europe and 
Central and Eastern Europe. Mudde identifies populism, defined as the conflict between the 
“pure people” and “the corrupt elite”, as a part of the maximum definition, it is damaging to a 
pan-European perspective, that the results do not confirm this for all of Europe (Mudde 2007).  
 
A potential reason for why Lack of Confidence – Parliament was insignificant in CEE can be 
found in an argument related to the explanation for the previous variable. While trust in 
politicians is on the decline in Western Europe, it is mainly PRR-parties that picture 
themselves to be representatives of a “distinct alternative outside the political class, clean-
hands alternatives, which want to give the power back to the people”, in the words of Jens 
Rydgren (Rydgren 2005a). While Central and Eastern European party systems by some is 
deemed to be consolidated (Lewis 2000, 2001, 2007b), others identifies some teething 
troubles in the form of higher voter volatility and party unstableness (Bakke 2002; Millard 
2004). The less stable party system frequently experience new parties, cadre parties, 
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organized around a few representatives in parliament, without any ties to civil society to 
mention (Jungerstam-Mulders 2006; Olson 1998). An EU-survey reveals that the new 
member states on average have 1.1 more parties than the old EU-15, leading to a more 
fragmented party system (Jungerstam-Mulders 2006:5). New parties will normally try to 
distance themselves from established parties. The most natural way to do so is for new parties 
to claim they represent something new and better than the existing party elites. Mudde also 
notes that populism is incorporated into mainstream politics too a much larger degree in CEE 
than in WE (Mudde 2007). Therefore, PRR-parties in CEE compete against other parties too a 
larger degree than the case is in WE.  
 
The results show that it is PRR-parties in WE, who mobilize voters on this issue due to 
political disillusionment, not parties in CEE. The hypothesis is rejected, but did manage to 
identify another difference between PRR-parties in WE and CEE.  
 
H3: PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilize voters that are negative to the EU 
 
One of the most deep going political changes in Europe has been the expansion of the 
European Union. The deepening of integration is a controversial project, not only for PRR-
parties. They base their resistance upon two main arguments. First, by definition they support 
the nation, and a supra-state project as the EU is on a collision course with this view from the 
beginning. Second, the political distance to Brussels does not harmonize with PRR-parties’ 
promise of bringing politics back to the people. The relatively short involvement in Central 
and Eastern Europe with the EU led the hypothesis to be geographically directed towards 
Western Europe.   
 
Lack of Confidence – EU is the second variable that is significant in all three models, and as 
such the results reveal that PRR-parties in both Western Europe and Central and Eastern 
Europe mobilize voters who lack confidence in the European Union. As mentioned in the 
paragraph above, the two major themes of nationalism and political disillusionment, serve to 
make this a profitable issue for the PRR-parties across Europe. The supranational elements of 
the EU are in clear opposition to the nationalistic elements of PRR-parties. Since the EU, by 
many, is perceived to be an elite project, with a relatively high degree of consensus within the 
political mainstream (Hix and Følledal 2005), this may very well be an issue the PRR can 
profit on in years to come. The descriptive analysis shows that lack of confidence in the 
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European Union is identical in Western and Central and Eastern Europe. Considering that it is 
also significant in both regions, it proves that the European Union is a political issue that has 
been politicized across Europe.  
 
A reason for this variable to be significant in both regions, and especially in CEE, may again 
be the positioning of the mainstream parties. Hooghe et al. identifies national party attitude to 
the EU as an inverted U-curve, where the wing-parties are against, whereas almost all 
mainstream parties support the European Union. (Hooghe et al. 2002). A study of the “anti-
EU” vote in national elections identifies PRR-parties among the leading parties of this bloc 
(Mair 2000). Opposed to some of the previous issues, it seems, based on the findings by 
Hooghe et al and Mair, that resistance of the European Union is a more exclusive issue for 
PRR-parties than a general lack of confidence in national parliaments and mainstream politics.  
 
While the variable is significant in both regions, the hypothesis must be rejected as it was 
directed against Western Europe. The analysis proves that PRR-parties in both Western 
Europe and Central and Eastern Europe mobilize voters that are negative to the European 
Union.  
 
H4: PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilise voters who feels that political financial 
involvement in environmental issues is unnecessary 
 
PRR-parties originated around the time when the Greens first appeared on the political stage 
in Western Europe. The argument behind this hypothesis has been that the big value shift that 
took place in the seventies triggered a counter-revolution to the Greens. Inglehart was aware 
of the contrasts between “new politics” and traditional values and norms (Inglehart 1977:13). 
Even as early as 1981, Lipset noted that post-materialist tendencies also generated a reactive 
support for right-wing social conservatism (Lipset 1981).  
 
Since it was thought to be a reaction to post-materialism and the value shift connected to it, it 
is a prerequisite that these conditions are present. Therefore it seemed most likely that PRR-
parties mobilized voters on this account in Western Europe.  
The results, however, did not reveal a very great significance for Environment – no financial 
support. It was one out of two variables that was not significant in the pan-European model. 
In CEE it was not significant, as expected. In WE it was not significant at the .05-level, but 
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did marginally achieve to be significant at the .10-level. While clearly being closer to 
significance in WE than in CEE, it is not significant at the desired cut-off point of this thesis. 
It also had a very low odds-ratio and standardized coefficient, further indicating a weak effect.  
The results reveal little evidence for PRR-parties constituting a counter-revolution against 
post-materialism. As expected there was no effect in CEE and the variable does not have a 
strong impact in WE either. This in line with earlier research done by Ivarsflaten (2008:12). 
As such the hypothesis must be rejected. PRR-parties do not mobilize voters due to a “silent 
counter-revolution”. 
 
H5a: PRR-parties in Eastern and Central Europe mobilize voters who support strong 
leadership 
 
Mudde identifies authoritarianism as one out of three elements in his maximum definition of 
populist radical right parties. Authoritarianism is defined as being subservient and uncritical 
towards authoritarian figures (Mudde 2007:22). While PRR-parties in Western Europe may 
be critical to how democracy works, they are not opponents of the principles of democracy 
itself. In Central and Eastern Europe the situation is more complex, Minkenberg claims 
parties are more reverse-oriented in that they are more openly anti-democratic (2002:358). 
With this in mind, I proposed a hypothesis that this form of authoritarianism mobilizes voters 
in CEE.  
 
Strong leader was borderline significant in the pan-European analysis, but was just above the 
cut-off point of .05-level of significance. As expected from the theoretical arguments, the 
variable was not significant in Western Europe. However, it did not yield significant results in 
Central and Eastern Europe either. The willingness to support a strong, authoritative leader is 
not a political issue that mobilize PRR-voters at all.  
 
This result has important implications for future research. First of all, it shows that democratic 
principles seem to have found solid ground also in CEE PRR-parties. While the result is valid 
only for this kind of parties, I interpret it as a signal that democracy is consolidating in the 
region as a whole. Second, it lends support to the point made by Mudde (2007), that while 
PRR-voters may support a strong authority, they do not follow it blindly. Giving the leader 
extra-parliamentary capabilities clearly does not sit well with the respondents in this thesis. 
  94 
Anyhow, the hypothesis is rejected. PRR-parties in Europe do not mobilize voters through 
support of a strong leader.  
 
H5b: PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilize voters who support stronger reactions to 
violations of the law 
 
The European Value Study did not contain any variables that were deemed suitable to 
represent this hypothesis. As such, the hypothesis is not answered in this thesis. This is a 
weakness, but a study of other potential datasets revealed that at least one hypothesis would 
have been left out anyway. The EVS was also the only dataset it was possible to extract 
variables on extremism from.  
 
H6: Economic preferences mobilize voters for PRR parties 
 
”It’s the economy, stupid”, the famous slogan penned, by James Carville during the first 
Clinton campaign in 1992, illustrates the importance of economic questions in politics. Big 
economic changes have taken place in Europe over the last decades, and especially so in 
Central and Eastern Europe. The hypothesis aims to reveal whether or not economic 
preferences mobilize voters for PRR-parties. While two of the earlier classics by Betz (1994) 
and Kitschelt (1995) give economic preferences a prominent place in their description of the 
PRR, recent research have questioned its importance (Carter 2005; Ivarsflaten 2005; Mudde 
2007).  
 
In Western Europe, PRR-parties have been seen as proponents for neo-liberalism and less 
state interventionism. However, the situation is different in Central and Eastern Europe, where 
the change from communism to capitalism has led to increasing inequality among citizens 
(Berglund et al. 2001:30). Several sources claims that there is a red-brown alliance in the 
region, mixing nationalistic rhetoric with leftist political ideas (Anastasakis 2000; Miller et al. 
1998). It is unclear whether economic preferences are something PRR-parties in Europe have 
in common, especially considering the unequal experiences they have with market economy. 
Primarily because of this discrepancy, the hypothesis has been formulated without a 
geographical direction.  
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Economic preferences is significant in the pan-European model. In Europe as a whole, for 
each increase on the left-right scale that constitute the variable, the odds for being a PRR-
voter increase with 1.8 percentage points. The variable was the weakest among those 
significant at the .05-level. The coefficient was positive, meaning that rightist economic 
preferences are preferred by PRR-voters.  
 
In Western Europe alone, the variable was no longer significant, albeit it still had a positive 
original coefficient. The same happened in the analysis for Central and Eastern Europe. The 
variable was no longer significant. Once again, the results of the pan-European analysis shade 
the results we get when regional analyses are conducted. However, in this case there is no 
difference between the regions. Economic preferences are not a significant issue neither in 
Western nor Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
The results support Mudde, who boldly states that ”it’s not the economy, stupid!” (Mudde 
2007:119). My analysis adds strength to his argument that the economy is secondary both to 
PRR-parties, as well as their electorates (Mudde 2007:119-120). Also, in the Central and 
Eastern Europe, the cleavage structure does not mirror those of Western Europe. While being 
present, the left-right cleavage is not as dominating as in Western Europe, reducing the 
importance of economic preferences (Bakke 2002:250) My findings support more recent 
accounts of the relationship between economic preferences and PRR-parties. As such, the 
hypothesis is rejected. PRR-parties do not mobilize voters on the basis of economic 
preferences.  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
The goal of this thesis has been to reveal whether or not PRR-voting can be explained by the 
same model in Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. My interest for this question 
was spurred by Cas Mudde’s book “Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe” (2007), where 
he includes parties from all of Europe in his analysis. By utilizing logistic regression I set 
forth to reveal which political issues mobilize voters for these parties, and more importantly, 
if there is a convergence between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. While 
Mudde used party manifestos as his primary source, I find it equally important to see in 
practice why voters vote for a PRR-party. Some of the results were as expected, while others 
proved to be more surprising. The objective for this conclusion is threefold. First, I will 
summarize the most important findings and answer the general research question, then explain 
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how my thesis has contributed to the overall research on PRR-parties, before ending with 
some suggestions for future research.  
 
5.3.1 Political issues mobilizing PRR-voters 
Some basic similarities were discovered early on. First of all, there is variation among the 
countries included in the analysis, which had to be accounted for through the inclusion of 
country dummies. Furthermore, two voter characteristics were significant in all analyses. As 
expected, a young male is the most likely PRR-voter, in the pan-European and Western 
European analysis, Education was also a significant characteristic. In the pan-European 
analysis, six variables were significant. Lack of Confidence – EU, Lack of Confidence – 
Parliament, Cultural resistance – Immigration, Employment resistance – Immigration, 
Extremist attitudes and Economic preferences. In Central and Eastern Europe, only two 
variables were significant, Lack of Confidence – EU and Extremist attitudes. While these two 
issues are shared by both regions, it is clear that the pan-European model is affected by the 
Western European results, not giving an accurate report of which issues that mobilize PRR-
voters in Central and Eastern Europe and to a degree also Western Europe. The thesis 
confirms that immigration is not a big political issue in Central and Eastern Europe. This has 
implications for those scholars who see mobilization on immigration as the uniting feature of 
PRR-parties in Western Europe. Continuing such logic, it is unlikely that they will find PRR-
parties in Central and Eastern Europe, further widening the definitional conflict within the 
literature. Lack of confidence – Parliament was also not significant in Central and Eastern 
Europe. With populism, defined as the conflict between the “pure people” and the “corrupt 
elite”, being a central element in Mudde’s definition, it is drawback for his approach that the 
variable is not significant in all of Europe. It is also worth noting that authoritarianism, in the 
form of anti-democracy is unable to mobilize voters, indicating that PRR-voters support 
democracy.  
 
The compared strength of some of the variables across regions yielded some surprising results. 
The case of Extremist attitudes was the most surprising case, which proved to have a higher 
effect for PRR-voting in WE than in CEE. In my opinion that is a result of the, on a general 
level, more radicalized political arena in Central and Eastern Europe. In that region PRR-
parties does not necessarily stand out on these issues as much as the case is in Western Europe. 
While PRR-parties in Western Europe might be the only party with a realistic opportunity of 
getting representation representing such views, the number of alternatives is larger in Central 
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and Eastern Europe, due to a more radical political climate. Alternatively, it is of course also 
possible that the issue is not salient enough to determine party choice in CEE.  
 
The same argument can be used when looking at the diverging results of Lack of Confidence – 
Parliament. In Western Europe it was a significant issue for PRR-voters, whereas in Central 
and Eastern Europe it did not prove to be significant. Mudde points that populism too a larger 
degree is a part of the political mainstream in Central and Eastern Europe (Mudde 2007). The 
higher volatility within the party system also creates a number of new parties that present 
themselves as new alternatives. Therefore PRR-parties do not get the status as the “only new 
alternative”, which they too a certain degree have profited from in Western Europe. 
 
It is also worth noting that both policy-issues and protest-issues are significant in the analyses. 
While the two Lack of- variables is more closely connected to protests against the ruling elites, 
other variables are more easily connected to policies. However, this is most visible in Western 
Europe where the immigration variables can be translated into policies on immigration. 
Extreme attitudes can also theoretically be translated into polices, but it would be harder to 
see how these would be acceptable to the general public.  
 
When considering the general research question, I argue that PRR-voting cannot be explained 
by the same model in Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe. Even though two 
issues, Extremist attitudes and Lack of Confidence – EU were significant in both regions, the 
differences in the overall models are too large to be neglected. When comparing the number 
of significant variables, the Western European model has three significant variables that were 
not significant in Central and Eastern Europe. Among those three are variables connected to 
the immigration question, thought to be the major area of competence for PRR-parties in 
Western Europe. Furthermore, the overall probability of the regional models reveals a 
difference of 26.8 per cent in favour of Western Europe.  
 
5.3.2 Contributions of this thesis 
By conducting three full analyses, one each for WE and CEE, and a full pan-European 
analysis, I have been able to highlight differences and similarities in PRR-voting in Europe. 
Despite some similarities, the differences between the models show that a complete pan-
European analysis is problematic. Despite the fact that the regions shared two variables, 
Extremist attitudes and Lack of Confidence – EU, the overall differences are too big to be 
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neglected. This is backed up by looking at the number of significant variables in the models, 
but also at the predicted probability for each of the models with an optimal combination of 
values on the significant variables. This indicates that while it seems to be similar parties 
when studying party manifestos, they attract voters on different issues. It is therefore of my 
opinion that pan-European analyses should be conducted with great carefulness, if at all, in 
the future. The most glaring example of how a pan-European analysis can distort the actual 
situation is how immigration seems to be an attractive issue, while it is still not politicized to a 
very high level, when looking exclusively at Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
The thesis has also shown the need for spending more time on demand-side studies, especially 
for Central and Eastern Europe. The thesis clearly shows that the “perfect breeding ground” 
has not been identified, when trying to explain how PRR-parties in the region mobilize voters.  
 
5.3.3 Suggestions for future research 
Mudde states that most of the research done on PRR-parties from Central and Eastern Europe 
are individual chapters and very little research of comparative nature.  It is my opinion that we 
need more comparative research that focuses solely on Central and Eastern Europe, to obtain 
a better understanding of these parties, before conducting more pan-European analyses. I 
argue that the results obtained in this thesis, show that political issues connected to the 
Western PRR-parties do not explain very much in a Central and Eastern European context. 
Future studies should also be able to discuss more clearly whether or not we are dealing with 
a single party group, or if Western and Central and Eastern Europe represent two divisions of 
a larger party group?  
 
In my thesis I have treated PRR-parties as part of either a Western or a Central and Eastern 
block. As the Wald-tests revealed, there are country differences within the two blocks. With 
better data it is possible to look closer at each individual party and pinpoint mobilizing issues 
even more accurately. As more quantitative data is gathered from Central and Eastern Europe, 
this will be easier to carry out. The European Value Study releases new data gathered in 2008 
in the fall of 2009, with data from 45 countries. This could serve as a fruitful dataset for 
further research.  
 
In addition to conducting new analysis on new and improved data, methodological advances 
can also provide new insight to PRR-parties in Europe. The fact that significant differences 
  99 
between countries were detected implies that a multi-level structure might be suitable. In 
addition to differences between countries differences between parties are also a highly likely 
situation.  
 
Multilevel analysis is able to include the context into the analysis and also study parties over 
time. Because, much of what is studied in the social sciences is of a multilevel character, 
multilevel-analyses should be used to a greater extent (Luke 2004; Raudenbush and Bryk 
2002). With regards to research on PRR-parties, a three-levelled structure of voters, parties 
and countries would be able to explain variation in the dependent variable at each level. This 
makes it possible to include both supply and demand-side variables in the same analysis.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 20 Questions in Economy-index 
 
No. Left Right 
Q54a The state should take more 
responsibility to ensure that 
everyone is provided for 
Individuals should take more 
responsibility for providing for 
themselves 
Q54c Competition is harmful, it brings 
out the worst in people 
Competition is good. It stimulates 
people to work hard and develop 
new ideas 
Q54d The state should control firms 
more effectively 
The state should give more 
freedom to firms 
 
 
 
Table 21 Levels of trust in national institutions 
 
Eurobarometer 69 – 2008      
Trust in government Trust in parliament (Not) Trust parties 
WE CEE WE CEE WE CEE 
43,2 % 25,8 %  49 %  20,6 % 66,5 %30 83,6 % 31 
      
Eurobarometer 68 – 2007      
WE CEE WE CEE WE CEE 
44,2 %  27, 3 % 47, 4 % 21, 9 % 24,5 % 10,7 % 
      
Candidate Countries EB - 2001      
WE CEE WE CEE WE CEE 
39, 8 % 34, 9 % 41, 5 % 27,5 % 18, 5 % 11,1 % 
      
 
 
 
Table 22 Frequencies of observations 
 
 CEE WE Total 
PRR 280 411 691 
Non-PRR 4939 5812 10751 
Total in analysis 5219 6223 11442 
Missing 1761 1885 3646 
Total in dataset 6980 8108 15088 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30
 Percentage indicates those who do not trust parties 
31
 Percentage indicates those who do not trust parties 
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Table 23 Frequencies of observations by country 
 
Country Frequency Percent 
France 1615 10.70 
Germany 2036 13.49 
Austria 1522 10.09 
Belgium 1912 12.67 
Denmark 1023 6.78 
Slovakia 1331 8.82 
Hungary 1000 6.63 
Romania 1146 7.60 
Croatia 1003 6.65 
Russia 2500 16.57 
Total 15088 100.00 
 
 
Table 24 Environment – no financial support - Index 
 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .500 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 8461,758 
 
df 1 
 
Sig. .000 
Factor Loadings Component 1 
 
 
environment: give part of income against environmental 
pollution (Q3A) 
.915 
 
environment: increase taxes to prevent environmental 
pollution (Q3B) 
.915 
Crohnbach’s Alpha N of Items 
.805 2 
 
 
Table 25 Economic preferences - Index  
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .598 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 2678.796 
 
df. 3 
 
Sig. .000 
Factor Loadings Component 1 
  
individual-state responsibility for providing (Q54A) .721 
state give more freedom to-control firms more effectively (Q54D) .762 
competition good-harmful for people (Q54C) .651 
Cronbach’s Alpha N of Items 
.516 3 
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Table 26 Extremist attitudes - Index 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .721 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 9901.455 
 
df. 6 
 
Sig. .000 
Factor Loadings Component 1 
  
dont like as neighbours: jews (Q7M) .788 
dont like as neighbours: gypsies (Q7N) .669 
dont like as neighbours: people of different race (Q7B) .757 
dont like as neighbours: homosexuals (Q7L) .673 
Cronbach’s Alpha N of Items 
.622 4 
 
 
Table 27 Vif and Tolerance-values for the variables 
 
 VIF   Tolerance   
Variable PE WE CEE PE WE CEE 
France 2.72 2.35  .367 .426  
Germany 3.12 2.60  .321 .385  
Austria 2.82 2.39  .354 .419  
Belgium 2.77 2.47  .361 .406  
Denmark** 2.06   .485   
Slovenia 2.15  1.99 .464  .501 
Hungary 2.10  2.03 .476  .493 
Romania 1.91  1.91 .525  .525 
Russia 2.62  2.29 .382  .437 
Croatia*       
Age 1.14 1.13 1.12 .881 .885 .892 
Female 1.02 1.02 1.02 .982 .978 .976 
Education 1.29 1.29 1.21 .778 .777 .826 
Unemployed 1.05 1.05 1.06 .950 .951 .945 
Lack of confidence – EU 1.20 1.21 1.19 .834 .827 .837 
Lack of confidence – Parliament 1.20 1.19 1.17 .833 .843 .853 
Strong leader 1.15 1.08 1.24 .869 .928 .805 
Cultural resistance – Immigration 1.16 1.04 1.11 .861 .923 .903 
Employement resistance – Immigration 1.16 1.08 1.19 .864 .860 .839 
Extremist attitudes 1.20 1.03 1.19 .831 .936 .837 
Economic preferences 1.14 1.05 1.16 .874 .899 .856 
Environment – no financial support 1.20 1.22 1.13 .833 .819 .885 
Party 1.08 1.13 1.02 .922 .882 .979 
* Used as a references category and not included in any analyses 
** Used as a reference category in the WE-model  
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Table 28 Dfbeta values – Robustness testing 
 
 PE WE CEE 
Variable Min Max Min  Max Min  Max 
Constant -.12619 .13758 -.06655 .08064 -.12770 .15860 
France -.02418 .03551 -.04631 .04958   
Germany -.03288 .03408 -.04980 .06426   
Austria -.02884 .04759 -.04888 .01525   
Belgium -.02737 .02551 -.05208 .02615   
Denmark -.01991 .03962     
Slovakia -.02484 .02401   -.07370 .03510 
Hungary -.02974 .02765   -.07332 .08959 
Romania -.02838 .02451   -.08228 .07033 
Russia -.02711 .02430   -.06796 .03570 
Age -.00087 .00122 -.00052 .00072 -.00075 .00117 
Female -.01835 .02160 -.00954 .01443 -.01424 .02270 
Education -.00786 .00998 -.00446 .00674 -.00895 .01042 
Unemployment -.11890 .16084 -.05208 .06014 -.01745 .04896 
Lack of confidence – EU -.03097 .02143 -.01872 .01517 -.03004 .02452 
Lack of confidence – Parliament -.03458 .02318 -.01993 .01253 -.04091 .02199 
Strong leader -.02546 .04159 -.01225 .01744 -.02367 .02810 
Cultural resistance – Immigration -.06207 .03874 -.03477 .02191 -.02144 .01968 
Employment resistance – Immigration -.02479 .02720 -.01995 .01514 -.02973 .02515 
Extremist attitudes -.04644 .07083 -.02088 .03116 -.02551 .03550 
Environment – no financial support -.01052 .00975 -.00698 .00548 -.00916 .01110 
Economic preferences -.00338 .00303 -.00194 .00159 -.00242 .00267 
 
 
Table 29 Testing significant improvement of models 1, 2 and 3  
 
Omnibus test of models Coefficients    
  Chi-square df Sig, 
From model 1 to model 2 Step 72.840 4 .000 
 Block 72.840 4 .000 
 Model 371.493 13 .000 
     
From model 2 to model 3 Step 155.190 8 .000 
 Block 155.190 8 .000 
 Model 526.683 21 .000 
 
